Related papers: On the Structure of Equilibria in Basic Network Fo…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
We investigate several variants of a network creation model: a group of agents builds up a network between them while trying to keep the costs of this network small. The cost function consists of two addends, namely (i) a constant amount…
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…
We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded in a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is to choose a strategy that maximizes her utility given the…
We show a simple method for constructing an infinite family of graph formation games with link bias so that the resulting games admits, as a \textit{pairwise stable} solution, a graph with an arbitrarily specified degree distribution.…
We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations…
A popular model to measure the stability of a network is k-core - the maximal induced subgraph in which every vertex has at least k neighbors. Many studies maximize the number of vertices in k-core to improve the stability of a network. In…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…
Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…
We consider eager-push epidemic dissemination in a complete graph. Time is divided into synchronous stages. In each stage, a source disseminates $\nu$ events. Each event is sent by the source, and forwarded by each node upon its first…
This study introduces the \emph{edge-based Shapley value}, a novel allocation rule within cooperative game theory, specifically tailored for networked systems, where value is generated through interactions represented by edges. Traditional…
This paper aims to maximize algebraic connectivity of networks via topology design under the presence of constraints and an adversary. We are concerned with three problems. First, we formulate the concave maximization topology design…
In this paper, we give an analytic solution for graphs with n nodes and E edges for which the probability of obtaining a given graph G is specified in terms of the degree sequence of G. We describe how this model naturally appears in the…
Complex systems of interacting components often can be modeled by a simple graph $\mathcal{G}$ that consists of a set of $n$ nodes and a set of $m$ edges. Such a graph can be represented by an adjacency matrix $A\in\R^{n\times n}$, whose…
Preferential attachment --- by which new nodes attach to existing nodes with probability proportional to the existing nodes' degree --- has become the standard growth model for scale-free networks, where the asymptotic probability of a node…
The interference at a wireless node s can be modelled by the number of wireless nodes whose transmission ranges cover s. Given a set of positions for wireless nodes, the interference minimization problem is to assign a transmission radius…
In this paper, we study a model of network formation in large populations. Each agent can choose the strength of interaction (i.e. connection) with other agents to find a Nash equilibrium. Different from the recently-developed theory of…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…