Related papers: Adaptive long-range migration promotes cooperation…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
Spatial structure is one of the simplest and most studied ecological factors that affect the evolution of cooperation. It has been shown that spatial reciprocity promotes cooperation due to the formation of cooperative clusters, which…
Cooperation within asymmetric populations has garnered significant attention in evolutionary games. This paper explores cooperation evolution in populations with weak and strong players, using a game model where players choose between…
Cooperation is fundamental to human societies. While several basic theoretical mechanisms underlying its evolution have been established, research addressing more realistic settings remains underdeveloped. Drawing on the hypothesis that…
The evolutionary persistence of symbiotic associations is a puzzle. Adaptation should eliminate cooperative traits if it is possible to enjoy the advantages of cooperation without reciprocating - a facet of cooperation known in game theory…
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…
In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators…
Cooperation is a vital social behavior that plays a crucial role in human prosperity, enabling conflict resolution and averting disastrous outcomes. With the increasing presence of autonomous agents (AAs), human-agent interaction becomes…
Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but…
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that…
Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is…
Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [Muchnik, \emph{et al.}, Sci. Rep. \textbf{3}, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in…
We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally…
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent.…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where…
In this paper, the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game in a spatial environment, with coevolutionary rules for both the strategy and network links between agents, is studied. Using a Monte Carlo simulation approach, a number of experiments are…
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…