Related papers: Contract agreements via logic
This paper concentrates on the representation of the legal relations that obtain between parties once they have entered a contractual agreement and their evolution as the agreement progresses through time. Contracts are regarded as process…
We develop a theory of contracting systems, where behavioural contracts may be violated by dishonest participants after they have been agreed upon - unlike in traditional approaches based on behavioural types. We consider the contracts of…
We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
In this paper, we present a probabilistic adaptation of an Assume/Guarantee contract formalism. For the sake of generality, we assume that the extended state machines used in the contracts and implementations define sets of runs on a given…
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, first, we systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are…
The game theory techniques are used to find the equilibrium of a market. Game theory refers to the ways in which strategic interactions among economic agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those agents,…
This note is concerned with a formal analysis of the problem of non-monotonic reasoning in intelligent systems, especially when the uncertainty is taken into account in a quantitative way. A firm connection between logic and probability is…
Classical probability theory is formulated using sets. In this paper, we extend classical probability theory with propositional computability logic. Unlike other formalisms, computability logic is built on the notion of events/games, which…
We present a process algebra based approach to formalize the interactions of computing devices such as the representation of policies and the resolution of conflicts. As an example we specify how promises may be used in coming to an…
In this study, we define interaction components of different orders between two input variables based on game theory. We further prove that interaction components of different orders satisfy several desirable properties.
We develop a model of abduction in abstract argumentation, where changes to an argumentation framework act as hypotheses to explain the support of an observation. We present dialogical proof theories for the main decision problems (i.e.,…
Justification theory is a unifying semantic framework. While it has its roots in non-monotonic logics, it can be applied to various areas in computer science, especially in explainable reasoning; its most central concept is a justification:…
Justification logics are modal-like logics with the additional capability of recording the reason, or justification, for modalities in syntactic structures, called justification terms. Justification logics can be seen as explicit…
Game semantics describe the interactive behavior of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. Such a semantics is introduced here for capturing dependencies induced by quantifications in first-order…
Based on an analysis of the inference rules used, we provide a characterization of the situations in which classical provability entails intuitionistic provability. We then examine the relationship of these derivability notions to uniform…
Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two players. Normal-form games model situations where the players simultaneously pick their moves. In this thesis we explore the strategic…
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
A game-theoretic model for the study of dynamic networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by communication networks that are subject to failure of nodes and where the restoration needs resources. The corresponding two-player game is…