Related papers: The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria

We show a communication complexity lower bound for finding a correlated equilibrium of a two-player game. More precisely, we define a two-player $N \times N$ game called the 2-cycle game and show that the randomized communication complexity…

We study policy optimization algorithms for computing correlated equilibria in multi-player general-sum Markov Games. Previous results achieve $O(T^{-1/2})$ convergence rate to a correlated equilibrium and an accelerated $O(T^{-3/4})$…

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…

This paper introduces constrained correlated equilibrium, a solution concept combining correlation and coupled constraints in finite non-cooperative games. In the general case of an arbitrary correlation device and coupled constraints in…

This paper investigates equilibrium computation and the price of anarchy for Bayesian games, which are the fundamental models of games with incomplete information. In normal-form games with complete information, it is known that efficiently…

We study the iteration complexity of decentralized learning of approximate correlated equilibria in incomplete information games. On the negative side, we prove that in $\mathit{extensive}$-$\mathit{form}$ $\mathit{games}$, assuming…

This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented many-player games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed…

In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…

Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…

Coordination in multiplayer games enables players to avoid the lose-lose outcome that often arises at Nash equilibria. However, designing a coordination mechanism typically requires the consideration of the joint actions of all players,…

Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control. The framework has…

We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…

Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…

The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…

Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…

We propose efficient no-regret learning dynamics and ellipsoid-based methods for computing linear correlated equilibria$\unicode{x2014}$a relaxation of correlated equilibria and a strengthening of coarse correlated…

Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…