Related papers: The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria
We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In…
One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist polynomial-time…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is \emph{query…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
A natural goal in multiagent learning besides finding equilibria is to learn rationalizable behavior, where players learn to avoid iteratively dominated actions. However, even in the basic setting of multiplayer general-sum games, existing…
We study N-player finite games with costs perturbed due to time-varying disturbances in the underlying system and to that end, we propose the concept of Robust Correlated Equilibrium that generalizes the definition of Correlated…
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
Correlated equilibria are a fundamental solution concept in game theory. However, despite decades of research, the complexity beyond games of polynomial type -- such as extensive-form games, congestion or routing games, and more broadly…
Markov games with coupling constraints model constrained dynamical decision-making involving self-interested agents, where the feasibility of an individual agent's strategy depends on the joint strategies of the others. Such games arise in…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We…
We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…
Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium by allowing a central coordinator to guide players' actions through shared recommendations, similar to how routing apps guide drivers. We investigate how a coordinator can learn a…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The…
We prove the existence of approximate correlated equilibrium of support size polylogarithmic in the number of players and the number of actions per player. In particular, using the probabilistic method, we show that there exists a multiset…