Related papers: Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Ol…
In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash…
The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation that stems…
This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…
We study the pay-as-bid auction game, a supply function model with discriminatory pricing and asymmetric firms. In this game, strategies are non-decreasing supply functions relating pric to quantity and the exact choice of the strategy…
This letter investigates the problem of distributed spectrum access for cognitive small cell networks. Compared with existing work, two inherent features are considered: i) the transmission of a cognitive small cell base station only…
We consider a wireless channel shared by multiple transmitter-receiver pairs. Their transmissions interfere with each other. Each transmitter-receiver pair aims to maximize its long-term average transmission rate subject to an average power…
This paper studies the economic utilities and the quality of service (QoS) in a two-sided non-neutral market where Internet service providers (ISPs) charge content providers (CPs) for the content delivery. We propose new models on a…
We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other…
In recent years, data has played an increasingly important role in the economy as a good in its own right. In many settings, data aggregators cannot directly verify the quality of the data they purchase, nor the effort exerted by data…
In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…
We consider a peer-to-peer electricity market, where agents hold private information that they might not want to share. The problem is modeled as a noncooperative communication game, which takes the form of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium…
There has been substantial recent concern that pricing algorithms might learn to ``collude.'' Supra-competitive prices can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of repeated pricing games, in which sellers play strategies which threaten to punish…
This paper examines whether widely used online learning algorithms in pricing can independently reach competitive outcomes or instead foster tacit collusion. This issue has drawn considerable attention from competition regulators as…
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in…
We consider the problem of partitioning a spectrum band into M channels of equal bandwidth, and then further assigning these M channels into P licensed channels and M-P unlicensed channels. Licensed channels can be accessed both for…
Today's queueing network systems are more rapidly evolving and more complex than those of even a few years ago. The goal of this paper is to study customers' behavior in an unobservable Markovian M/M/1 queue where consumers have to choose…
We consider the use of pricing as a regulatory mechanism when an unknown number of autonomous agents compete for access to a shared resource (possibly limited in volume or capacity). In standard dynamic pricing control systems, an…
In this paper, we investigate the problem of spectrum access decision-making for the Secondary Users (SUs) in the cognitive radio networks. When the Primary Users (PUs) are absent on certain frequency bandwidth, SUs can formulate a queue…
Recent initiatives by regulatory agencies to increase spectrum resources available for broadband access include rules for sharing spectrum with high-priority incumbents. We study a model in which wireless Service Providers (SPs) charge for…
We study combinatorial auctions for the secondary spectrum market. In this market, short-term licenses shall be given to wireless nodes for communication in their local neighborhood. In contrast to the primary market, channels can be…