Related papers: Analytical Approach to Parallel Repetition

In this work we show a barrier towards proving a randomness-efficient parallel repetition, a promising avenue for achieving many tight inapproximability results. Feige and Kilian (STOC'95) proved an impossibility result for…

Computing Nash equilibrium in multi-agent games is a longstanding challenge at the interface of game theory and computer science. It is well known that a general normal form game in N players and k strategies requires exponential space…

We study the numerical approximation of a time-dependent variational mean field game system with local couplings and either periodic or Neumann boundary conditions. Following a variational approach, we employ a finite difference…

We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…

In an iterated game between two players, there is much interest in characterizing the set of feasible payoffs for both players when one player uses a fixed strategy and the other player is free to switch. Such characterizations have led to…

Since the seminal PPAD-completeness result for computing a Nash equilibrium even in two-player games, an important line of research has focused on relaxations achievable in polynomial time. In this paper, we consider the notion of…

Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…

We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…

We introduce a new technique for designing fixed-parameter algorithms for cut problems, namely randomized contractions. We apply our framework to obtain the first FPT algorithm for the Unique Label Cover problem and new FPT algorithms with…

We study an extension of the well-known red-blue pebble game (RBP) with partial computation steps, inspired by the recent work of Sobczyk. While the original RBP assumes that we need to have all the inputs of an operation in fast memory at…

We present a unifying representation of computation as a two-player game between an \emph{Algorithm} and \emph{Nature}, grounded in domain theory and game theory. The Algorithm produces progressively refined approximations within a Scott…

We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of the game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

With increasing interest in procedural content generation by academia and game developers alike, it is vital that different approaches can be compared fairly. However, evaluating procedurally generated video game levels is often difficult,…

We propose a framework to compute approximate Nash equilibria in integer programming games with nonlinear payoffs, i.e., simultaneous and non-cooperative games where each player solves a parametrized mixed-integer nonlinear program. We…

Despite recent advancements in machine learning, in practice, relevant datasets are often distributed among market competitors who are reluctant to share. To incentivize data sharing, recent works propose analytics markets, where multiple…

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards has recently advanced the capabilities of Large Language Models in complex reasoning tasks by providing explicit rule-based supervision. Among RLVR methods, GRPO and its variants have achieved…

The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be "fairly" divided among players. While it has a wide range of real…

Whether a PTAS (polynomial-time approximation scheme) exists for game equilibria has been an open question, and its absence has indications and consequences in three fields: the practicality of methods in algorithmic game theory,…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…