Related papers: Bertrand Networks
An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this…
Banks routinely use neural networks to make decisions. While these models offer higher accuracy, they are susceptible to adversarial attacks, a risk often overlooked in the context of event sequences, particularly sequences of financial…
The rapid expansion of digital commerce platforms has amplified the strategic importance of coordinated pricing and inventory management decisions among competing retailers. Motivated by practices on leading e-commerce platforms, we analyze…
We study the optimal mechanism design problem faced by a market intermediary who makes revenue by connecting buyers and sellers. We first show that the optimal intermediation protocol has substantial structure: it is the solution to an…
Consumers in many markets are uncertain about firms' qualities and costs, so buy based on both the price and the quality inferred from it. Optimal pricing depends on consumer heterogeneity only when firms with higher quality have higher…
We study gains from trade in multi-dimensional two-sided markets. Specifically, we focus on a setting with $n$ heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller $i$, and there is a constrained-additive buyer with…
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints…
We investigate the model of multiple contests held in parallel, where each contestant selects one contest to join and each contest designer decides the prize structure to compete for the participation of contestants. We first analyze the…
Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…
In this discussion draft, we explore heterogeneous oligopoly games of increasing players with quadratic costs, where the market is supposed to have the isoelastic demand. For each of the models considered in this draft, we analytically…
We review the statistical mechanics approach to the study of the emerging collective behavior of systems of heterogeneous interacting agents. The general framework is presented through examples is such contexts as ecosystem dynamics and…
Understanding the structure and formation of networks is a central topic in complexity science. Economic networks are formed by decisions of individual agents and thus not properly described by established random graph models. In this…
Network equilibrium models represent a versatile tool for the analysis of interconnected objects and their relationships. They have been widely employed in both science and engineering to study the behavior of complex systems under various…
A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism in…
We consider zero-sum games in which players move between adjacent states, where in each pair of adjacent states one state dominates the other. The states in our game can represent positional advantages in physical conflict such as high…
Selfish Network Creation focuses on modeling real world networks from a game-theoretic point of view. One of the classic models by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] is the network creation game, where agents correspond to nodes in a network which…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
We study revenue optimization in a repeated auction between a single seller and a single buyer. Traditionally, the design of repeated auctions requires strong modeling assumptions about the bidder behavior, such as it being myopic, infinite…
The game of bridge consists of two stages: bidding and playing. While playing is proved to be relatively easy for computer programs, bidding is very challenging. During the bidding stage, each player knowing only his/her own cards needs to…
Competition between alternative states is an essential process in social and biological networks. Neutral competition can be represented by an unbiased random drift process in which the states of vertices (e.g., opinions, genotypes, or…