Related papers: Soft Games

We propose the study of mathematical ludology, which aims to formally interrogate questions of interest to game studies and game design in particular. The goal is to extend our mathematical understanding of complex games beyond…

Parity games can be used to represent many different kinds of decision problems. In practice, tools that use parity games often rely on a specification in a higher-order logic from which the actual game can be obtained by means of an…

The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium.…

This work establishes sufficient conditions for existence of saddle points in discrete Markov games. The result reveals the relation between dynamic games and static games using dynamic programming equations. This result enables us to prove…

The concept of Soft set theory was introduced by Molodtsov in the study [8]. Soft real numbers and properties were introduced inthe study [6] and soft normed space was defined in [11]. In this study, firstly we obtain a soft normed space by…

In this paper, we discuss a class of two-stage hierarchical games with multiple leaders and followers, which is called Nash-Stackelberg-Nash (N-S-N) games. Particularly, we consider N-S-N games under decision-dependent uncertainties (DDUs).…

Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formation is unstable and incentivizes deviation from the proposed…

This contribution deals with a two-level discrete decision problem, a so-called Stackelberg strategic game: A Subset Sum setting is addressed with a set $N$ of items with given integer weights. One distinguished player, the leader, may…

Bilevel optimization problems involve two nested objectives, where an upper-level objective depends on a solution to a lower-level problem. When the latter is non-convex, multiple critical points may be present, leading to an ambiguous…

We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…

In the present work we deal with set-valued equilibrium problems for which we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution. The conditions that we consider are imposed not on the whole domain, but rather on a self…

In applied game theory the motivation of players is a key element. It is encoded in the payoffs of the game form and often based on utility functions. But there are cases were formal descriptions in the form of a utility function do not…

Let $T:X\to X $ and $S:Y \to Y$ be continuous maps defined on compact sets. Let $$\varphi_i(\mu,\nu)=\int_{X \times Y} A_i(x,y) d\mu(x) d\nu(y)\;\;{for} \;\; i=1,2,$$ where $\mu$ is $T$-invariant and $\nu$ is $S$-invariant, be pay-off…

Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…

We define generalized quantum games by introducing the coherent payoff operators and propose a simple scheme to illustrate it. The scheme is implemented with a single spin qubit system and two entangled qubit system. The Nash Equilibrium…

A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…

We unify standard frameworks for approachability both in full or partial monitoring by defining a new abstract game, called the "purely informative game", where the outcome at each stage is the maximal information players can obtain,…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…