Related papers: A Zero-Sum Stochastic Game with Compact Action Set…

The paper investigates the long-time behavior of zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential games, aiming to demonstrate that, under appropriate conditions, both the saddle strategy and the optimal state process exhibit the…

We present two zero-sum games modeling situations where one player attacks (or hides in) a finite dimensional nonempty compact set, and the other tries to prevent the attack (or find him). The first game, called patrolling game, corresponds…

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…

We provide a direct, elementary proof for the existence of $\lim_{\lambda\to 0} v_{\lambda}$, where $v_{\lambda}$ is the value of a $\lambda$-discounted finite two-person zero-sum stochastic game.

We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…

In the present work, we consider 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential games with a nonlinear pay-off functional which is defined through a backward stochastic differential equation. Our main objective is to study for such a game the…

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…

This paper addresses zero-sum ``turn'' games, in which only one player can make decisions at each state. We show that pure saddle-point state-feedback policies for turn games can be constructed from dynamic programming fixed-point equations…

We show that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets and bounded, Borel-measurable, and shift-invariant payoffs, admits an $\ep$-equilibrium for all $\varepsilon>0$.

We consider a zero-sum stochastic differential game over elementary mixed feed-back strategies. These are strategies based only on the knowledge of the past state, randomized continuously in time from a sampling distribution which is kept…

In this paper, zero-sum mean-field type games (ZSMFTG) with linear dynamics and quadratic utility are studied under infinite-horizon discounted utility function. ZSMFTG are a class of games in which two decision makers whose utilities sum…

We present a new tool for the study of multiplayer stochastic games, namely the modified game, which is a normal-form game that depends on the discount factor, the initial state, and for every player a partition of the set of states and a…

We study some ergodicity property of zero-sum stochastic games with a finite state space and possibly unbounded payoffs. We formulate this property in operator-theoretical terms, involving the solvability of an optimality equation for the…

We consider Gillette's two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. For each $k \in \ZZ_+$ we introduce an effective reward function, called $k$-total. For $k = 0$ and $1$ this function is known as {\it mean payoff} and…

We consider a zero-sum stochastic differential controller-and-stopper game in which the state process is a controlled diffusion evolving in a multi-dimensional Euclidean space. In this game, the controller affects both the drift and the…

We study a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel of discrete type. The game is considered from the point of view of various criterions of optimality. We prove existence of…

We generalize the results of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) on zero sum stochastic differential games to the case when the controls are unbounded. We do this by proving a dynamic programming principle using a covering argument instead of…

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for…

Just as war is sometimes fallaciously represented as a zero sum game -- when in fact war is a negative sum game - stock market trading, a positive sum game over time, is often erroneously represented as a zero sum game. This is called the…

Quitting games are one of the simplest stochastic games in which at any stage each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payoff,…