Related papers: Infinite-state games with finitary conditions
On a filtered probability space $(\Omega ,\mathcal{F}, (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t\in[0,\infty]}, \mathbb{P})$, we consider the two-player non-zero-sum stopping game $u^i := \mathbb{E}[U^i(\rho,\tau)],\ i=1,2$, where the first player choose a…
We study the sample complexity of identifying an approximate equilibrium for two-player zero-sum $n\times 2$ matrix games. That is, in a sequence of repeated game plays, how many rounds must the two players play before reaching an…
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
We study the existence of positional strategies for the protagonist in infinite duration games over arbitrary game graphs. We prove that prefix-independent objectives in $\Sigma_0^2$ which are positional and admit a (strongly) neutral…
We consider parity games on infinite graphs where configurations are represented by control-states and integer vectors. This framework subsumes two classic game problems: parity games on vector addition systems with states (vass) and…
The value of a finite-state two-player zero-sum stochastic game with limit-average payoff can be approximated to within $\epsilon$ in time exponential in a polynomial in the size of the game times polynomial in logarithmic in…
We consider infinite-state Attacker-Defender games with reachability objectives. The results of the paper are twofold. Firstly we prove a new language-theoretic result for weighted automata on infinite words and show its encoding into the…
We present a systematic investigation of the quantum games, constructed using a novel repeated game protocol, when played repeatedly ad infinitum. We focus on establishing that such repeated games -- by virtue of inherent quantum-mechanical…
This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called \emph{bidding games}, showing the existence…
In the theory of games on infinite-state arenas, there is a stark contrast between (i) recursion-based models such as pushdown systems and extensions on one hand, and (ii) counter-based models like vector addition systems with states (VASS)…
The performance of two pivoting algorithms, due to Lemke and Cottle and Dantzig, is studied on linear complementarity problems (LCPs) that arise from infinite games, such as parity, average-reward, and discounted games. The algorithms have…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…
We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…
We are interested in the convergence of the value of n-stage games as n goes to infinity and the existence of the uniform value in stochastic games with a general set of states and finite sets of actions where the transition is commutative.…
We consider two-player games played in real time on game structures with clocks and parity objectives. The games are concurrent in that at each turn, both players independently propose a time delay and an action, and the action with the…
We study repeated games played by players with bounded computational power, where, in contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), the memory is costly. We prove a folk theorem: the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in mixed strategies, as the…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…