Related papers: On the Robust Optimal Stopping Problem
We consider a stochastic differential equation that is controlled by means of an additive finite-variation process. A singular stochastic controller, who is a minimizer, determines this finite-variation process, while a discretionary…
Motivated by a problem posed by Aldous, our goal is to find the maximal-entropy win-martingale: In a sports game between two teams, the chance the home team wins is initially $x_0 \in (0,1)$ and finally 0 or 1. As an idealization we take a…
We consider a class of zero-sum stopper vs. singular-controller games in which the controller can only act on a subset $d_0<d$ of the $d$ coordinates of a controlled diffusion. Due to the constraint on the control directions these games…
In this article we study an optimal stopping/optimal control problem which models the decision facing a risk-averse agent over when to sell an asset. The market is incomplete so that the asset exposure cannot be hedged. In addition to the…
We study an optimal stopping problem with an unbounded, time-dependent and discontinuous reward function. This problem is motivated by the pricing of a variable annuity contract with guaranteed minimum maturity benefit, under the assumption…
In this paper we consider a method of solving optimal stopping problems in discrete and continuous time based on their dual representation. A novel and generic simulation-based optimization algorithm not involving nested simulations is…
Optimal stopping is the problem of deciding when to stop a stochastic system to obtain the greatest reward, arising in numerous application areas such as finance, healthcare and marketing. State-of-the-art methods for high-dimensional…
We show, under weaker assumptions than in the previous literature, that a perpetual optimal stopping game always has a value. We also show that there exists an optimal stopping time for the seller, but not necessarily for the buyer.…
We consider a zero-sum continuous time stopping game in which the pay-off is revealed in the maximum of the two stopping times instead of the minimum, which is the case in Dynkin games.
This note considers a variation of the full-information secretary problem where the random variables to be observed are independent and identically distributed. Consider $X_1,\dots,X_n$ to be an independent sequence of random variables, let…
We propose and analyze a continuous-time robust reinforcement learning framework for optimal stopping under ambiguity. In this framework, an agent chooses a robust exploratory stopping time motivated by two objectives: robust…
In this paper we revisit an open problem posed by Aldous on the max-entropy win-probability martingale: given two players of equal strength, such that the win-probability is a martingale diffusion, which of these processes has maximum…
In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with Borel state and action spaces and bounded reward. The term risk-sensitive refers to the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral optimization…
We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that…
Many decision problems in economics, information technology, and industry can be transformed to an optimal stopping of adapted random vectors with some utility function over the set of Markov times with respect to filtration build by the…
We introduce and analyze a natural game formulated as follows. In this one-person game, the player is given a random permutation $A=(a_1,\dots, a_n)$ of a multiset $M$ of $n$ reals that sum up to $0$, where each of the $n!$ permutation…
We analyze an optimal stopping problem with a series of inequality-type and equality-type expectation constraints in a general non-Markovian framework. We show that the optimal stopping problem with expectation constraints (OSEC) in an…
A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…
We develop methods to solve general optimal stopping problems with opportunities to stop that arrive randomly. Such problems occur naturally in applications with market frictions. Pivotal to our approach is that our methods operate on…
In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of 2-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and certain $2$-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is…