Related papers: On Dynamics in Selfish Network Creation
Examining the behavior of multi-agent systems is vitally important to many emerging distributed applications - game theory has emerged as a powerful tool set in which to do so. The main approach of game-theoretic techniques is to model…
Systems of competing agents can often be modeled as games. Assuming rationality, the most likely outcomes are given by an equilibrium (e.g. a Nash equilibrium). In many practical settings, games are influenced by context, i.e. additional…
Kleinberg proposed a family of small-world networks to explain the navigability of large-scale real-world social networks. However, the underlying mechanism that drives real networks to be navigable is not yet well understood. In this…
Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…
This paper aims to design a distributed coordination algorithm for solving a multi-agent decision problem with a hierarchical structure. The primary goal is to search the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game such that each player has…
This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…
This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to…
This paper considers a game-theoretic framework for distributed machine learning problems over networks where the information acquisition at a node is modeled as a rational choice of a player. In the proposed game, players decide both the…
In the classical framework of local distributed network computing, it is generally assumed that the entities executing distributed algorithms are altruistic. However, in various scenarios, the value of the output produced by an entity may…
The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classical model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a prefixed price $\alpha>0$ in order to get connected to the…
Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…
Games are natural models for multi-agent machine learning settings, such as generative adversarial networks (GANs). The desirable outcomes from algorithmic interactions in these games are encoded as game theoretic equilibrium concepts, e.g.…
Demand response has been a promising solution for accommodating renewable energy in power systems. In this study, we consider a demand response scheme within a distribution network facing an energy supply deficit. The utility company…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…
The property of the communication network and the constraints on the strategic space are two factors that determine the complexity of the distributed Nash equilibrium (DNE) seeking problem. The DNE seeking problem of aggregative games has…
We study Nash equilibria in the network creation game of Fabrikant et al.[10]. In this game a vertex can buy an edge to another vertex for a cost of $\alpha$, and the objective of each vertex is to minimize the sum of the costs of the edges…
We analyse the typical structure of games in terms of the connectivity properties of their best-response graphs. Our central result shows that, among games that are `generic' (without indifferences) and that have a pure Nash equilibrium,…
Inspired by real world examples, e.g. the Internet, researchers have introduced an abundance of strategic games to study natural phenomena in networks. Unfortunately, almost all of these games have the conceptual drawback of being…