Related papers: On the inverse power index problem

Determining how close a winner of an election is to becoming a loser, or distinguishing between different possible winners of an election, are major problems in computational social choice. We tackle these problems for so-called weighted…

Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee selection rules found in the literature consider the coalitional possibilities among the…

In Network games under cooperative framework, the position value is a link based allocation rule. It is obtained from the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game where the links of the network are considered players. The Shapley…

Consider an election between k candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for…

We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We propose \emph{influence games} as a \emph{game-theoretic} model of the…

Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We consider the computational problem of constructive election…

This paper deals with a new measure of the influence of each feature on the response variable in classification problems, accounting for potential dependencies among certain feature subsets. Within this framework, we consider a sample of…

Zipf's law is well known in linguistics: the frequency of a word is inversely proportional to its rank. This is a special case of a more general power law, a common phenomenon in many kinds of real-world statistical data. Here, it is shown…

In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…

We introduce the notion of linearly representable games. Broadly speaking, these are TU games that can be described by as many parameters as the number of players, like weighted voting games, airport games, or bankruptcy games. We show that…

There are many factors that can influence the outcome of an election. We here identify two dominant effects that can affect the votes obtained by a candidate, namely, the Majority Effect and the Media Effect. We mimic these two effects in a…

We introduce a new simple game, which is referred to as the complementary weighted multiple majority game (C-WMMG for short). C-WMMG models a basic cooperation rule, the complementary cooperation rule, and can be taken as a sister model of…

We generalise the problem of inverse reinforcement learning to multiple tasks, from multiple demonstrations. Each one may represent one expert trying to solve a different task, or as different experts trying to solve the same task. Our main…

We study inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) and imitation learning (IM), the problems of recovering a reward or policy function from expert's demonstrated trajectories. We propose a new way to improve the learning process by adding a…

Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…

We consider weighted sums of independent random variables regulated by an increment sequence. We provide operative conditions that ensure strong law of large numbers for such sums to hold in both the centered and non-centered case. The…

In the United States electoral system, a candidate is elected indirectly by winning a majority of electoral votes cast by individual states, the election usually being decided by the votes cast by a small number of "swing states" where the…

We introduce an evolutionary game with feedback between perception and reality, which we call the reality game. It is a game of chance in which the probabilities for different objective outcomes (e.g., heads or tails in a coin toss) depend…

Big Boss Games represent a specific class of cooperative games where a single veto player, known as the Big Boss, plays a central role in determining resource allocation and maintaining coalition stability. In this paper, we introduce a…

By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more voters can change the election outcome in their favour by…