Related papers: Greedy Selfish Network Creation
This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…
Communication networks are essential for our economy and our everyday lives. This makes them lucrative targets for attacks. Today, we see an ongoing battle between criminals that try to disrupt our key communication networks and security…
We show that training of generative adversarial network (GAN) may not have good generalization properties; e.g., training may appear successful but the trained distribution may be far from target distribution in standard metrics. However,…
In this paper, the problem of finding a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of a networked game is studied. Players are only able to choose their decisions from a feasible action set. The feasible set is considered to be a private linear…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) represent a zero-sum game between two machine players, a generator and a discriminator, designed to learn the distribution of data. While GANs have achieved state-of-the-art performance in several…
In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…
In this paper, we study the problem of consensus-based distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking where a network of players, abstracted as a directed graph, aim to minimize their own local cost functions non-cooperatively. Considering the…
We investigate several variants of a network creation model: a group of agents builds up a network between them while trying to keep the costs of this network small. The cost function consists of two addends, namely (i) a constant amount…
Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack, as well as…
The Kelly or proportional allocation mechanism is a simple and efficient auction-based scheme that distributes an infinitely divisible resource proportionally to the agents bids. When agents are aware of the allocation rule, their…
We study the problem of distributed state estimation in a network of sensing units that can exchange their measurements but the rate of communication between the units is constrained. The units collect noisy, possibly only partial…
Inspired by real world examples, e.g. the Internet, researchers have introduced an abundance of strategic games to study natural phenomena in networks. Unfortunately, almost all of these games have the conceptual drawback of being…
Many policy problems involve designing individualized treatment allocation rules to maximize the equilibrium social welfare of interacting agents. Focusing on large-scale simultaneous decision games with strategic complementarities, we…
Current research in distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in the partial information setting assumes that information is exchanged between agents that are "truthful". However, in general noncooperative games agents may consider sending…
We model a system of networking agents that seek to optimize their centrality in the network while keeping their cost, the number of connections they are participating in, low. Unlike other game-theory based models for network evolution,…
The submodular maximization problem is widely applicable in many engineering problems where objectives exhibit diminishing returns. While this problem is known to be NP-hard for certain subclasses of objective functions, there is a greedy…
In Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), a population reaches a Nash equilibrium when none of the agents can improve its objective by solely changing its strategy on its own. Roughly speaking, this equilibrium is a protection against betrayal.…
In this paper, we consider the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in strongly monotone games. First, we propose a novel continuous-time solution algorithm that uses regular projections and first-order information. As…
We consider n agents located on the vertices of a connected graph. Each agent v receives a signal X_v(0)~N(s, 1) where s is an unknown quantity. A natural iterative way of estimating s is to perform the following procedure. At iteration t +…