Related papers: Interdependent Defense Games: Modeling Interdepend…

Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems…

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…

Designing optimal interdependent networks is important for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infrastructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic model in which two network designers choose to maximize the global…

The increasing prevalence of security attacks on software-intensive systems calls for new, effective methods for detecting and responding to these attacks. As one promising approach, game theory provides analytical tools for modeling the…

In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical framework to investigate advanced persistent threat problems with two types of insider threats: malicious and inadvertent. Within this framework, a unified three-player game is established and…

Constrained Markov games offer a formal mathematical framework for modeling multi-agent reinforcement learning problems where the behavior of the agents is subject to constraints. In this work, we focus on the recently introduced class of…

We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins…

Recent advances in adversarial machine learning have shown that defenses considered to be robust are actually susceptible to adversarial attacks which are specifically customized to target their weaknesses. These defenses include Barrage of…

We introduce a novel framework for computing optimal randomized security policies in networked domains which extends previous approaches in several ways. First, we extend previous linear programming techniques for Stackelberg security games…

In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience.…

With the increasing connectivity enabled by the Internet of Things (IoT), security becomes a critical concern, and the users should invest to secure their IoT applications. Due to the massive devices in the IoT network, users cannot be…

Security attacks present unique challenges to self-adaptive system design due to the adversarial nature of the environment. However, modeling the system as a single player, as done in prior works in security domain, is insufficient for the…

We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph,…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a network control system. We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player,…

This paper provides an efficient computational scheme to handle general security games from an adversarial risk analysis perspective. Two cases in relation to single-stage and multi-stage simultaneous defend-attack games motivate our…

Cybersecurity risk analysis plays an essential role in supporting organizations make effective decision about how to manage and control cybersecurity risk. Cybersecurity risk is a function of the interplay between the defender, i.e., the…

In this paper, we consider a new network security game wherein an attacker and a defender are battling over "multiple" targets. This type of game is appropriate to model many current network security conflicts such as Internet phishing,…

Adversarial attacks can generate adversarial inputs by applying small but intentionally worst-case perturbations to samples from the dataset, which leads to even state-of-the-art deep neural networks outputting incorrect answers with high…