Related papers: On Dynkin games with incomplete information
We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…
We investigate zero-sum turn-based two-player stochastic games in which the objective of one player is to maximize the amount of rewards obtained during a play, while the other aims at minimizing it. We focus on games in which the minimizer…
We consider the problem of numerically approximating the solutions to a partial differential equation (PDE) when there is insufficient information to determine a unique solution. Our main example is the Poisson boundary value problem, when…
Players are statistical learners who learn about payoffs from data. They may interpret the same data differently, but have common knowledge of a class of learning procedures. I propose a metric for the analyst's "confidence" in a strategic…
This paper is concerned with the controller-and-stopper stochastic differential game under a regime switching model in an infinite horizon. The state of the system consists of a number of diffusions \emph{coupled} by a continuous-time…
In this paper we consider Dynkin's games with payoffs which are functions of an underlying process. Assuming extended weak convergence of underlying processes $\{S^{(n)}\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$ to a limit process $S$ we prove convergence Dynkin's…
This paper uses recent results on continuous-time finite-horizon optimal switching problems with negative switching costs to prove the existence of a saddle point in an optimal stopping (Dynkin) game. Sufficient conditions for the game's…
Our original results are associated to a multitime hybrid game, with two equips of players, based on a multiple integral functional and an m- ow as constraint. The aim of this paper is three-fold: (i) to define the multitime lower or upper…
We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…
Static potential games are non-cooperative games which admit a fictitious function, also referred to as a potential function, such that the minimizers of this function constitute a subset (or a refinement) of the Nash equilibrium strategies…
Many decision problems in economics, information technology, and industry can be transformed to an optimal stopping of adapted random vectors with some utility function over the set of Markov times with respect to filtration build by the…
Encoding and decoding are the two key steps in information processing. In this work we study the encoding and decoding capabilities of operational theories in the context of information-storability game, where the task is to freely choose a…
We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical schemes for the value function of this game, which is given…
We introduce the "relative diffuseness" assumption to characterize the differences between payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant diffuseness of information. Based on this assumption, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with…
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time admits an epsilon-equilibrium in randomized stopping times. We provide a condition that ensures the existence of an epsilon-equilibrium in non-randomized stopping…
Two-player, turn-based, stochastic games with reachability conditions are considered, where the maximizer has no information (he is blind) and is restricted to deterministic strategies whereas the minimizer is perfectly informed. We ask the…
Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…
In a zero-sum stochastic game with signals, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by these decisions and a variable called state. The state follows a Markov chain, that is controlled by…
We study a two player repeated zero-sum game with asymmetric information introduced by Renault in which the underlying state of the game undergoes Markov evolution (parameterized by a transition probability $\frac 12\le p\le 1$). H\"orner,…