Related papers: Stackelberg Shortest Path Tree Game, Revisited
Let $G$ be a directed graph with $n$ vertices, $m$ edges, and non-negative edge costs. Given $G$, a fixed source vertex $s$, and a positive integer $p$, we consider the problem of computing, for each vertex $t\neq s$, $p$ edge-disjoint…
Let $G_{n,p}$ be the standard Erd\H{o}s-R\'enyi-Gilbert random graph and let $G_{n,n,p}$ be the random bipartite graph on $n+n$ vertices, where each $e\in [n]^2$ appears as an edge independently with probability $p$. For a graph $G=(V,E)$,…
We investigate a process of joining $k$ random spanning trees on a fixed clique $K_n$. The joined trees may not be disjoint and multiple edges are replaced by one simple edge. This process produces a simple graph $G$ on $n$~vertices with an…
We study an envy-free pricing problem, in which each buyer wishes to buy a shortest path connecting her individual pair of vertices in a network owned by a single vendor. The vendor sets the prices of individual edges with the aim of…
In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid prosumers, who can simultaneously consume and produce energy, and a grid power company is studied. The problem is formulated as a single-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg…
We present polylogarithmic approximation algorithms for variants of the Shortest Path, Group Steiner Tree, and Group ATSP problems with vector costs. In these problems, each edge e has a non-negative vector cost $c_e \in…
Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weighted graph by Leader (Player 0) and Follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, Leader announces her strategy, second,…
We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…
In this paper, we study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that…
Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to…
The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…
We study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that Player 1 has a…
In this work, we use a Stackelberg infinite discrete-time dynamic game model to study the optimal supply schedule and the optimal demand response under a market-driven dynamic price. A two-layer optimization framework is established. At the…
We consider the problem of efficiently learning to play single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg games when the leader lacks knowledge of the lower-level game. Such games arise in hierarchical decision-making problems involving…
Finding shortest paths in a given network (e.g., a computer network or a road network) is a well-studied task with many applications. We consider this task under the presence of an adversary, who can manipulate the network by perturbing its…
In a directed graph $G$ with non-correlated edge lengths and costs, the \emph{network design problem with bounded distances} asks for a cost-minimal spanning subgraph subject to a length bound for all node pairs. We give a bi-criteria…
This study introduces the \emph{edge-based Shapley value}, a novel allocation rule within cooperative game theory, specifically tailored for networked systems, where value is generated through interactions represented by edges. Traditional…
For the well-known Survivable Network Design Problem (SNDP) we are given an undirected graph $G$ with edge costs, a set $R$ of terminal vertices, and an integer demand $d_{s,t}$ for every terminal pair $s,t\in R$. The task is to compute a…
We introduce a model of a controlled random graph process. In this model, the edges of the complete graph $K_n$ are ordered randomly and then revealed, one by one, to a player called Builder. He must decide, immediately and irrevocably,…
In the famous network creation game of Fabrikant et al. a set of agents play a game to build a connected graph. The $n$ agents form the vertex set $V$ of the graph and each vertex $v\in V$ buys a set $E_v$ of edges inducing a graph…