Related papers: Patience of Matrix Games

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…

Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…

In this paper we study the zero-sum and nonzero-sum differential games with not assuming Isaacs condition. Along with the partition $\pi$ of the time interval $[0,T]$, we choose the suitable random non-anticipative strategy with delay to…

We construct a non-locality game that can be won with certainty by a quantum strategy using log n shared EPR-pairs, while any classical strategy has winning probability at most 1/2+O(log n/sqrt{n}). This improves upon a recent result of…

We show that for any $\varepsilon>0$ there is an XOR game $G=G(\varepsilon)$ with $\Theta(\varepsilon^{-1/5})$ inputs for one player and $\Theta(\varepsilon^{-2/5})$ inputs for the other player such that $\Omega(\varepsilon^{-1/5})$ ebits…

Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…

In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases the probability of play…

Leadership games provide a powerful paradigm to model many real-world settings. Most literature focuses on games with a single follower who acts optimistically, breaking ties in favour of the leader. Unfortunately, for real-world…

Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…

Consider concurrent, infinite duration, two-player win/lose games played on graphs. If the winning condition satisfies some simple requirement, the existence of Player 1 winning (finite-memory) strategies is equivalent to the existence of…

The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

In this paper, we consider a zero-sum undiscounted stochastic game which has finite state space and finitely many pure actions. Also, we assume the transition probability of the undiscounted stochastic game is controlled by one player and…

This short note demonstrates how one can define a transformation of a non-zero sum game into a zero sum, so that the optimal mixed strategy achieving equilibrium always exists. The transformation is equivalent to introduction of a passive…

Differential games, in particular two-player sequential zero-sum games (a.k.a. minimax optimization), have been an important modeling tool in applied science and received renewed interest in machine learning due to many recent applications,…

This paper develops a unified framework for zero-sum games in which both the pure strategies and the payoff matrices contain complex-valued entries. By leveraging a linear isomorphism between complex and real vector spaces, we extend key…

We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…

In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…

We consider a class of zero-sum search games in which a Hider hides one or more target among a set of $n$ boxes. The boxes may require differing amount of time to search, and detection may be imperfect, so that there is a certain…

Let $ex(n, P)$ be the maximum possible number of ones in any 0-1 matrix of dimensions $n \times n$ that avoids $P$. Matrix $P$ is called minimally non-linear if $ex(n, P) = \omega(n)$ but $ex(n, P') = O(n)$ for every strict subpattern $P'$…