Related papers: Tight Lower Bounds for Unequal Division
Let $F(x,y)$ be an irreducible form of degree $r\geq 3$ and having $s+1$ non-zero coefficients. Let $h\geq 1$ be an integer and consider the Thue inequality $$|F(x,y)|\leq h.$$ Following the seminal work of Thue in 1909, several papers were…
The classic cake cutting problem concerns the fair allocation of a heterogeneous resource among interested agents. In this paper, we study a public goods variant of the problem, where instead of competing with one another for the cake, the…
In the envy-free cake-cutting problem we are given a resource, usually called a cake and represented as the $[0,1]$ interval, and a set of $n$ agents with heterogeneous preferences over pieces of the cake. The goal is to divide the cake…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a two dimensional heterogeneous good among multiple players. Applications include division of land as well as ad space in print and electronic media. Classical cake cutting protocols primarily…
A division of a cake by n people is envy free if everyone thinks they got the biggest pieces. Note that peoples tastes can differ. There is a discrete protocol for envy free division for n=3 which takes at most 5 cuts. For n=4 and beyond…
The twin prime conjecture asserts that there are infinitely many pairs of primes that differ by two. While recent advances have improved our understanding of bounded prime gaps, the conjecture remains unresolved. This paper refines the…
In this paper, we consider the classic fair division problem of allocating $m$ divisible items to $n$ agents with linear valuations over the items. We define novel notions of fair shares from the perspective of individual agents via the…
We study the query complexity of cake cutting and give lower and upper bounds for computing approximately envy-free, perfect, and equitable allocations with the minimum number of cuts. The lower bounds are tight for computing connected…
A cake has to be divided fairly among $n$ agents. When all agents have equal entitlements, it is known that such a division can be implemented with $n-1$ cuts. When agents may have different entitlements, the paper shows that at least $2 n…
In this article we suggest a model of computation for the cake cutting problem. In this model the mediator can ask the same queries as in the Robertson-Webb model but he or she can only perform algebraic operations as in the Blum-Shub-Smale…
Classic cake-cutting algorithms enable people with different preferences to divide among them a heterogeneous resource (``cake''), such that the resulting division is fair according to each agent's individual preferences. However, these…
We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works,…
Suppose $a^2 (a^2 + 1)$ divides $b^2 (b^2 + 1)$ with $b > a$. In this paper, we improve a previous result and prove a gap principle, without any additional assumptions, namely $b \gg a (\log a)^{1/8} / (\log \log a)^{12}$. We also obtain $b…
We study the problem of fair cake-cutting where each agent receives a connected piece of the cake. A division of the cake is deemed fair if it is equitable, which means that all agents derive the same value from their assigned piece. Prior…
Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…
In this paper we present some extensions of the Ailon-Rudnick Theorem, which says that if $f,g\in{\mathbb C}[T]$, then $\gcd(f^n-1,g^m-1)$ is bounded for all $n,m\ge 1$. More precisely, using a uniform bound for the number of torsion points…
We construct an infinite family of two-Lee-weight and three-Lee-weight codes over the chain ring $\mathbb{F}_p+u\mathbb{F}_p.$ They have the algebraic structure of abelian codes. Their Lee weight distribution is computed by using Gauss…
We investigate the problem of fairly dividing a divisible heterogeneous resource, also known as a cake, among a set of agents who may have different entitlements. We characterize the existence of a connected strongly-proportional allocation…
We introduce a graphical framework for fair division in cake cutting, where comparisons between agents are limited by an underlying network structure. We generalize the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality to this…
In this note we study a problem of fair division in the absence of full information. We give an algorithm which solves the following problem: n $\ge$ 2 persons want to cut a cake into n shares so that each person will get at least 1/n of…