Related papers: Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash impleme…
We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…
Consider spies infiltrating a network or dissidents secretly organising under a dictatorship. Such scenarios can be cast as adversarial social network analysis problems involving nodes connecting while evading network analysis tools, e.g.,…
Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…
This note investigates how to design topology structures to ensure the controllability of multi-agent networks (MASs) under any selection of leaders. We put forward a concept of perfect controllability, which means that a multi-agent system…
We propose a novel formulation of the "effectiveness problem" in communications, put forth by Shannon and Weaver in their seminal work [2], by considering multiple agents communicating over a noisy channel in order to achieve better…
We study the problem of resilient consensus of sampled-data multi-agent networks with double-integrator dynamics. The term resilient points to algorithms considering the presence of attacks by faulty/malicious agents in the network. Each…
Agent-based modeling is a paradigm of modeling dynamic systems of interacting agents that are individually governed by specified behavioral rules. Training a model of such agents to produce an emergent behavior by specification of the…
We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a…
We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Moses & Nachum ([7]) identify conceptual flaws in Bacharach's generalization ([3]) of Aumann's seminal "agreeing to disagree" result ([1]). Essentially, Bacharach's framework requires agents' decision functions to be defined over events…
We consider a routing game among non-atomic agents where link latency functions are conditional on an uncertain state of the network. The agents have the same prior belief about the state, but only a fixed fraction receive private route…
In the setting where information cannot be verified, we propose a simple yet powerful information theoretical framework---the Mutual Information Paradigm---for information elicitation mechanisms. Our framework pays every agent a measure of…
Robustness is one of the key properties of nowadays networks. However, robustness cannot be simply enforced by design or regulation since many important networks, most prominently the Internet, are not created and controlled by a central…
We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents, built on a common cardinalization of their preferences. Our…
In revenue maximization of selling a digital product in a social network, the utility of an agent is often considered to have two parts: a private valuation, and linearly additive influences from other agents. We study the incomplete…
AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay…
Multi-agent systems outperform single agent in complex collaborative tasks. However, in large-scale scenarios, ensuring timely information exchange during decentralized task execution remains a challenge. This work presents an online…
In this paper, we consider game problems played by (multi)-integrator agents, subject to external disturbances. We propose Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics based on gradient-play, augmented with a dynamic internal-model based component,…
A theorem on (partial) convergence to consensus of multiagent systems is presented. It is proven with tools studying the convergence properties of products of row stochastic matrices with positive diagonals which are infinite to the left.…