Related papers: A note on the voting problem
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. These actions modify an election's participation structure and aim at either making a…
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explore which (if any) fairness guarantees can be provided under…
A central question in verification is characterizing when a system has invariants of a certain form, and then synthesizing them. We say a system has a $k$ linear invariant, $k$-LI in short, if it has a conjunction of $k$ linear (non-strict)…
A set $U$ of unit vectors is selectively balancing if one can find two disjoint subsets $U^+$ and $U^-$, not both empty, such that the Euclidean distance between the sum of $U^+$ and the sum of $U^-$ is smaller than $1$. We prove that the…
Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries toaffect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent is to make a specific candidate either win…
Each voter $i \in I$ has $\alpha_i$ cards that (s)he distributes among the candidates $a \in A$ as a measure of approval. One (or several) candidate(s) who received the maximum number of cards is (are) elected. We provide polynomial…
A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum,…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
For a graph $G$ and a parameter $k$, we call a vertex $k$-enabling if it belongs both to a clique of size $k$ and to an independent set of size $k$, and we call it $k$-excluding otherwise. Motivated by issues that arise in secret sharing…
Given an $n$-vertex graph $G$ and two positive integers $d,k \in \mathbb{N}$, the ($d,kn$)-differential coloring problem asks for a coloring of the vertices of $G$ (if one exists) with distinct numbers from 1 to $kn$ (treated as…
In this paper, we present a private voting system that consists of N authorized voters who may vote to one of the K candidates or vote abstain. Each voter wants to compute the final tally while staying private and robust against malicious…
This paper begins with a general theory of error in cross-validation testing of algorithms for supervised learning from examples. It is assumed that the examples are described by attribute-value pairs, where the values are symbolic.…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…
In the $k$-Orthogonal Vectors ($k$-OV) problem we are given $k$ sets, each containing $n$ binary vectors of dimension $d=n^{o(1)}$, and our goal is to pick one vector from each set so that at each coordinate at least one vector has a zero.…
We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are…
This note characterizes every qualified majority voting rule in environments with just two alternatives through anonymity, responsiveness, and q-neutrality. Crucially, the latter imposes independence of the labels of the alternatives if and…
We study the query complexity of Weak Parity: the problem of computing the parity of an n-bit input string, where one only has to succeed on a 1/2+eps fraction of input strings, but must do so with high probability on those inputs where one…
This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of…
Democracy relies on making collective decisions through voting. In addition, voting procedures have further applications, for example in the training of artificial intelligence. An essential criterion for determining the winner of a fair…
Solving a delegation graph for transitive votes is already a non-trivial task for many programmers. When extending the current main paradigm, where each voter can only appoint a single transitive delegation, to a system where each vote can…