Related papers: A note on the voting problem

Criteria for a good voting system have been given particularly careful scrutiny in recent years, with general agreement that the core values are fair results, voter power and choice, and local representation. This paper reexamines the basic…

A preference profile with m alternatives and n voters is 2-dimensional Euclidean if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into a 2-dimensional space such that for each pair of alternatives, every voter prefers the one which has…

Limited Voting (LV) is an approval-based method for multi-winner elections where all ballots are required to have a same fixed size. While it appears to be used as voting method in corporate governance and has some political applications,…

We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…

We study the complexity of determining a winning committee under the Chamberlin--Courant voting rule when voters' preferences are single-crossing on a line, or, more generally, on a median graph (this class of graphs includes, e.g., trees…

PARITY is the problem of determining the parity of a string $f$ of $n$ bits given access to an oracle that responds to a query $x\in\{0,1,...,n-1\}$ with the $x^{\rm th}$ bit of the string, $f(x)$. Classically, $n$ queries are required to…

Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters…

We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size…

We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are…

The main result is the following Theorem: Let p=p(n) be such that p(n) in [0,1] for all n and either p(n)<< n^{-1} or for some positive integer k, n^{-1/k}<< p(n)<< n^{-1/(k+1)} or for all epsilon >0, n^{- epsilon}<< p(n) and n^{-…

We describe a slightly sub-exponential time algorithm for learning parity functions in the presence of random classification noise. This results in a polynomial-time algorithm for the case of parity functions that depend on only the first…

We consider the problem of electing a committee of $k$ candidates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed to look like. In our framework, the candidates are given labels as an abstraction of a politician's…

We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the second stage that…

We investigate preference profiles for a set $\mathcal{V}$ of voters, where each voter $i$ has a preference order $\succ_i$ on a finite set $A$ of alternatives (that is, a linear order on $A$) such that for each two alternatives $a,b\in A$,…

We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to…

In this paper, we study the following problem. Consider a setting where a proposal is offered to the vertices of a given network $G$, and the vertices must conduct a vote and decide whether to accept the proposal or reject it. Each vertex…

We explore the relation between two natural symmetry properties of voting rules. The first is transitive-symmetry -- the property of invariance to a transitive permutation group -- while the second is the "unbiased" property of every voter…

Given $n$ elements, an integer $k$ and a parameter $\varepsilon$, we study to select an element with rank in $(k-n\varepsilon,k+n\varepsilon]$ using unreliable comparisons where the outcome of each comparison is incorrect independently with…

In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences…

We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…