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In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…
Self-interested behavior in sharing economies often leads to inefficient aggregate outcomes compared to a centrally coordinated allocation, ultimately harming users. Yet, centralized coordination removes individual decision power. This…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
Many poker systems, whether created with heuristics or machine learning, rely on the probability of winning as a key input. However calculating the precise probability using combinatorics is an intractable problem, so instead we approximate…
We consider a stochastic volatility model with jumps where the underlying asset price is driven by the process sum of a 2-dimensional Brownian motion and a 2-dimensional compensated Poisson process. The market is incomplete, resulting in…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
Every open-system dynamics can be associated to infinitely many stochastic pictures, called unravelings, which have proved to be extremely useful in several contexts, both from the conceptual and the practical point of view. Here, focusing…
We investigate the distribution of the well-studied Shapley--Shubik values in weighted voting games where the agents are stochastically determined. The Shapley--Shubik value measures the voting power of an agent, in typical collective…
For a semimartingale with jumps, we propose a new estimation method for integrated volatility, i.e., the quadratic variation of the continuous martingale part, based on the global jump filter proposed by Inatsugu and Yoshida [8]. To decide…
Two-player graph games are a fundamental model for reasoning about the interaction of agents. These games are played between two players who move a token along a graph. In bidding games, the players have some monetary budget, and at each…
We price and replicate a variety of claims written on the log price $X$ and quadratic variation $[X]$ of a risky asset, modeled as a positive semimartingale, subject to stochastic volatility and jumps. The pricing and hedging formulas do…
A class of non-compact billiards is introduced, namely the infinite step billiards, i.e., systems of a point particle moving freely in the domain $\Omega = \bigcup_{n\in\N} [n,n+1] \times [0,p_n]$, with elastic reflections on the boundary;…
We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…
A gambler walks into a hypothetical fair casino with a very real dollar bill, but by the time he leaves he's exchanged the dollar for a random amount of money. What is lost in the process? It may be that the gambler walks out at the end of…
We propose a new estimation scheme for estimation of the volatility parameters of a semimartingale with jumps based on a jump-detection filter. Our filter uses all of data to analyze the relative size of increments and to discriminate jumps…
In this work, we propose a model for estimating volatility from financial time series, extending the non-Gaussian family of space-state models with exact marginal likelihood proposed by Gamerman, Santos and Franco (2013). On the literature…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
In a zero-sum stochastic game with signals, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by these decisions and a variable called state. The state follows a Markov chain, that is controlled by…
From the standpoint of game theory, dominoes is a game that has not received much attention (specially the variety known as draw). It is usually thought that this game is already solved, given general results in game theory. However, the…