Related papers: A Concise Resolution to the Two Envelope Paradox

The primary objective of this note is to revisit the two envelope problem and propose a simple resolution. It is argued that the paradox arises from the ambiguity associated with the money content $x of the chosen envelope. When X=x is…

The "paradox" arises in the Two Envelopes Paradox from the incorrect formulation of the argument. The infomation given is misused and therefore the results are incorrect for the question asked. The key is to be clear on what question we are…

The two envelopes paradox is discussed. By calculating the conditional probability, we arrive at a conditional expectations which differs from existing results.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the (non-Bayesian and Bayesian) two-envelope problems in terms of quantum language (or, measurement theory), which was recently proposed as a linguistic turn of quantum mechanics (with the Copenhagen…

There are many papers written on the Two Envelopes Problem that usually study some of its variations. In this paper we will study and compare the most significant variations of the problem. We will see the correct decisions for each player…

Consider the following game: You are given two indistinguishable envelopes, each containing money. One contains twice as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep the money it contains. Having chosen an envelope, you are given…

In Newcomb's paradox you choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose, a prediction algorithm deduces your choice, and fills the two boxes based…

This paper proposes a careful separation between an entity's epistemic system and their decision system. Crucially, Bayesian counterfactuals are estimated by the epistemic system; not by the decision system. Based on this remark, I prove…

This paper presents a plausible reasoning system to illustrate some broad issues in knowledge representation: dualities between different reasoning forms, the difficulty of unifying complementary reasoning styles, and the approximate nature…

The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puzzling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, they…

I think we can agree that dealing with uncertainty is not easy. Probability is the main tool for dealing with uncertainty, and we know there are many probability-related puzzles and paradoxes. Here I describe a rather idiosyncratic…

We give a new proof for Godel's second incompleteness theorem, based on Kolmogorov complexity, Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, and an argument that resembles the surprise examination paradox. We then go the other way around and suggest…

This paper is motivated by the questions of how to give the concept of probability an adequate real-world meaning, and how to explain a certain type of phenomenon that can be found, for instance, in Ellsberg's paradox. It attempts to answer…

Two types of approximation to the paradoxical Russell Set are presented, one approximating it from below, one from above. It is shown that any lower approximation gives rise to a better approximation containing it, and that any upper…

In Newcomb's paradox you choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose though, an antagonist uses a prediction algorithm to deduce your choice,…

This paper discusses the dual interpretation of the Jeffreys--Lindley's paradox associated with Bayesian posterior probabilities and Bayes factors, both as a differentiation between frequentist and Bayesian statistics and as a pointer to…

We revisit the flatland paradox proposed by \cite{ston1976} which is an example of non-conglomerability. The aim of the paper is to show that the improperness of the prior is not directly involved in the inconsistency. First, we show that…

Well known Simpson's paradox is puzzling and surprising for many, especially for the empirical researchers and users of statistics. However there is no surprise as far as mathematical details are concerned. A lot more is written about the…

We reveal a contradiction in measure-theoretic probability. The contradiction is an "equation" $1/2 = 0$ with its two sides representing probabilities. Unlike known paradoxes in mathematics, the revealed contradiction cannot be explained…

In 1957, Lindley published "A statistical paradox" in Biometrika, revealing a fundamental conflict between frequentist and Bayesian inference as sample size approaches infinity. We present a new paradox of a different kind: a conflict…