Related papers: Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency i…

In this work, we study stochastic non-cooperative games, where only noisy black-box function evaluations are available to estimate the cost function for each player. Since each player's cost function depends on both its own decision…

This article studies the user behavior in non-atomic congestion games. We consider non-atomic congestion games with continuous and non-decreasing functions and investigate the limit of the price of anarchy when the total user volume…

We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and demand…

This paper considers coverage games in which a group of agents are tasked with identifying the highest-value subset of resources; in this context, game-theoretic approaches are known to yield Nash equilibria within a factor of 2 of optimal.…

We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which…

We consider the design of a fair sensor schedule for a number of sensors monitoring different linear time-invariant processes. The largest average remote estimation error among all processes is to be minimized. We first consider a general…

This paper introduces alignment games, a new class of zero-sum games modeling strategic interventions where effectiveness depends on alignment with an underlying hidden state. Motivated by operational problems in medical diagnostics,…

A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing…

This paper considers the scheduling of stochastic jobs on parallel identical machines to minimize the expected total weighted completion time. While this is a classical problem with a significant body of research on approximation algorithms…

Zero-sum games arise in a wide variety of problems, including robust optimization and adversarial learning. However, algorithms deployed for finding a local Nash equilibrium in these games often converge to non-Nash stationary points. This…

We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classical model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a prefixed price $\alpha>0$ in order to get connected to the…

We study the pay-as-bid auction game, a supply function model with discriminatory pricing and asymmetric firms. In this game, strategies are non-decreasing supply functions relating pric to quantity and the exact choice of the strategy…

With the success of modern machine learning, it is becoming increasingly important to understand and control how learning algorithms interact. Unfortunately, negative results from game theory show there is little hope of understanding or…

We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or…

While delegating tasks to large language models (LLMs) can save people time, there is growing evidence that offloading tasks to such models produces social costs. We use behavior in two canonical economic games to study whether people have…

For job scheduling systems, where jobs require some amount of processing and then leave the system, it is natural for each user to provide an estimate of their job's time requirement in order to aid the scheduler. However, if there is no…

Priced timed games are optimal-cost reachability games played between two players---the controller and the environment---by moving a token along the edges of infinite graphs of configurations of priced timed automata. The goal of the…

We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…

We propose to smooth out the calibration score, which measures how good a forecaster is, by combining nearby forecasts. While regular calibration can be guaranteed only by randomized forecasting procedures, we show that smooth calibration…

This paper addresses the matter of inequality in network formation games. We employ a quantity that we are calling the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined as the maximal ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to individual…