Related papers: Strictly Proper Mechanisms with Cooperating Player…
This paper studies matching markets in the presence of middlemen. In our framework, a buyer-seller pair may either trade directly or use the services of a middleman; and a middleman may serve multiple buyer-seller pairs. Direct trade…
Motivated by the prevalence of prediction problems in the economy, we study markets in which firms sell models to a consumer to help improve their prediction. Firms decide whether to enter, choose models to train on their data, and set…
All proper scoring rules incentivize an expert to predict \emph{accurately} (report their true estimate), but not all proper scoring rules equally incentivize \emph{precision}. Rather than treating the expert's belief as exogenously given,…
Peer-prediction is a mechanism which elicits privately-held, non-variable information from self-interested agents---formally, truth-telling is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. The original Peer-prediction mechanism suffers…
We provide self-contained proof of a theorem relating probabilistic coherence of forecasts to their non-domination by rival forecasts with respect to any proper scoring rule. The theorem appears to be new but is closely related to results…
Recommender systems play an increasingly crucial role in shaping people's opportunities, particularly in online dating platforms. It is essential from the user's perspective to increase the probability of matching with a suitable partner…
We prove the sharp bound for the probability that two experts who have access to different information, represented by different $\sigma$-fields, will give radically different estimates of the probability of an event. This is relevant when…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
Using the Minority Game model we study a broad spectrum of problems of market mechanism. We study the role of different types of agents: producers, speculators as well as noise traders. The central issue here is the information flow :…
Economies and societal structures in general are complex stochastic systems which may not lend themselves well to algebraic analysis. An addition of subjective value criteria to the mechanics of interacting agents will further complicate…
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict…
Humans judge each other's actions, which at least partly functions to detect and deter cheating and to enable helpfulness in an indirect reciprocity fashion. However, most forms of judging do not only concern the action itself, but also the…
In credit markets, screening algorithms aim to discriminate between good-type and bad-type borrowers. However, when doing so, they can also discriminate between individuals sharing a protected attribute (e.g. gender, age, racial origin) and…
In many settings, an effective way of evaluating objects of interest is to collect evaluations from dispersed individuals and to aggregate these evaluations together. Some examples are categorizing online content and evaluating student…
This paper studies multilateral matching in which agents may negotiate contracts within any coalition. We assume scale economies such that an agent substitutes some existing contracts with new ones only if the latter involve a set of…
In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a…
We characterize the optimal reward functions (scoring rules) that incentivize an agent to acquire information and report it truthfully to the principal. The optimal scoring rules let the agent make a simple binary bet in single-dimensional…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…
Combining models in appropriate ways to achieve high performance is commonly seen in machine learning fields today. Although a large amount of combinatorial models have been created, little attention is drawn to the commons in different…