Related papers: Solving Cooperative Reliability Games
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…
We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…
In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…
In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be divided among the agents in some reasonable manner. Cooperative…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
We consider fractional linear programming production games for the single-objective and multiobjective cases. We use the method of Chakraborty and Gupta (2002) in order to transform the fractional linear programming problems into linear…
In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately representing games is challenging. In such cases, using an…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational…
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…
User interactions in online recommendation platforms create interdependencies among content creators: feedback on one creator's content influences the system's learning and, in turn, the exposure of other creators' contents. To analyze…
We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function $C$ is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be derived from data, represented as tuples $(S, C(S))$, for different subsets $S$ of…
Incomplete cooperative games generalise the classical model of cooperative games by omitting the values of some of the coalitions. This allows to incorporate uncertainty into the model and study the underlying games as well as possible…
We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry,…
We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…