Related papers: Parrondo games with spatial dependence
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…
A large class of Positional Games are defined on the complete graph on $n$ vertices. The players, Maker and Breaker, take the edges of the graph in turns, and Maker wins iff his subgraph has a given -- usually monotone -- property. Here we…
Consider a coin tossing experiment which consists of tossing one of two coins at a time, according to a renewal process. The first coin is fair and the second has probability $1/2 + \theta$, $\theta \in [-1/2,1/2]$, $\theta$ unknown but…
The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings,…
Trust and reciprocation of it form the foundation of economic, social and other interactions. While the Trust Game is widely used to study these concepts for interactions between two players, often alternating different roles (i.e.,…
Penney's game is a two player zero-sum game in which each player chooses a three-flip pattern of heads and tails and the winner is the player whose pattern occurs first in repeated tosses of a fair coin. Because the players choose…
This paper studies a simple class of zero-sum games played by two competing quantum players: each player sends a mixed quantum state to a referee, who performs a joint measurement on the two states to determine the players' payoffs. We…
Partizan subtraction games are combinatorial games where two players, say Left and Right, alternately remove a number n of tokens from a heap of tokens, with $n \in S_L$ (resp. $n \in S_R$) when it is Left's (resp. Right's) turn. The first…
We construct a non-locality game that can be won with certainty by a quantum strategy using log n shared EPR-pairs, while any classical strategy has winning probability at most 1/2+O(log n/sqrt{n}). This improves upon a recent result of…
Nonlocality enables two parties to win specific games with probabilities strictly higher than allowed by any classical theory. Nevertheless, all known such examples consider games where the two parties have a common interest, since they…
Research has shown that the addition of abstention as an option transforms social dilemmas to rock-paper-scissor type games, where defectors dominate cooperators, cooperators dominate abstainers (loners), and abstainers (loners), in turn,…
Two players alternate tossing a biased coin where the probability of getting heads is p. The current player is awarded alpha points for tails and alpha+beta for heads. The first player reaching n points wins. For a completely unfair coin…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…
This paper coins the notion of Joker games, a variant of concurrent games where the players are not strictly adversarial. Instead, Player 1 can get help from Player 2 by playing a Joker move. We formalize these games as cost games and…
In this paper, we introduce post-selection games, a generalization of nonlocal games where each round can be not only won or lost by the players, but also discarded by the referee. Such games naturally formalize possibilistic proofs of…
We consider multi-player graph games with partial-observation and parity objective. While the decision problem for three-player games with a coalition of the first and second players against the third player is undecidable, we present a…
The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains a puzzle for \text{evolutionary game theory} precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of natural selection. Accordingly,…
The range of a payoff function for an $n$-player finite strategic game is investigated using a novel approach, the notion of extreme points of a non-convex set. The shape of a noncooperative payoff region can be estimated using extreme…
When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in…
Duparc introduced a two-player game for a function $f$ between zero-dimensional Polish spaces in which Player II has a winning strategy iff $f$ is of Baire class 1. We generalize this result by defining a game for an arbitrary function $f :…