Related papers: Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoff…
This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…
We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…
McLennan and Tourky (2010) showed that "imitation games" provide a new view of the computation of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with the Lemke-Howson algorithm. In an imitation game, the payoff matrix of one of the players is the…
A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency with which the action has been chosen in the past. We…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
In the theory of games on infinite-state arenas, there is a stark contrast between (i) recursion-based models such as pushdown systems and extensions on one hand, and (ii) counter-based models like vector addition systems with states (VASS)…
In an iterated game between two players, there is much interest in characterizing the set of feasible payoffs for both players when one player uses a fixed strategy and the other player is free to switch. Such characterizations have led to…
A game-theoretic model for the study of dynamic networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by communication networks that are subject to failure of nodes and where the restoration needs resources. The corresponding two-player game is…
Vector Addition Systems (VAS), aka Petri nets, are a popular model of concurrency. The reachability set of a VAS is the set of configurations reachable from the initial configuration. Leroux has studied the geometric properties of VAS…
This paper reframes approachability theory within the context of population games. Thus, whilst one player aims at driving her average payoff to a predefined set, her opponent is not malevolent but rather extracted randomly from a…
We study so-called invariant games played with a fixed number $d$ of heaps of matches. A game is described by a finite list $\mathcal{M}$ of integer vectors of length $d$ specifying the legal moves. A move consists in changing the current…
For a topological space $X$ and a point $x \in X$, consider the following game -- related to the property of $X$ being countably tight at $x$. In each inning $n\in\omega$, the first player chooses a set $A_n$ that clusters at $x$, and then…
We consider {\em bidding games}, a class of two-player zero-sum {\em graph games}. The game proceeds as follows. Both players have bounded budgets. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, in each turn the players simultaneously submit…
We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…
We study repeated multi-player vector-valued games in which a player observes a payoff vector each round and evaluates outcomes through linear scalarizations of those vectors. Different from most prior works, the choice of scalarization is…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players…
Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multi-player replicator dynamics in a constant environment. The two-player terms…
This paper presents a new solution concept for multiplayer stochastic games, namely, acceptable strategy profiles. For each player $i$ and state $s$ in a stochastic game, let $w_i(s)$ be a real number. A strategy profile is…
A combinatorial game is a two-player game without hidden information or chance elements. One of the major approaches to analyzing games in combinatorial game theory is to break down a given game position into a disjunctive sum of multiple…