Related papers: Voting Power : A Generalised Framework
This brief discusses evolutionary game theory as a powerful and unified mathematical tool to study evolution of collective behaviours. It summarises some of my recent research directions using evolutionary game theory methods, which include…
Concurrent game frames are a standard semantic framework for logics of strategic reasoning. Two notions of coalition power can be derived from such frames: alpha powers and actual powers. An alpha power of a coalition is a set of possible…
The future smart grid is envisioned as a large-scale cyber-physical system encompassing advanced power, communications, control, and computing technologies. In order to accommodate these technologies, it will have to build on solid…
We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…
This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…
This article develops a framework for testing general hypothesis in high-dimensional models where the number of variables may far exceed the number of observations. Existing literature has considered less than a handful of hypotheses, such…
We present a unifying framework encompassing many social choice settings. Viewing each social choice setting as voting in a suitable metric space, we consider a general model of social choice over metric spaces, in which---similarly to the…
Voting systems typically treat all voters equally. We argue that perhaps they should not: Voters who have supported good choices in the past should be given higher weight than voters who have supported bad ones. To develop a formal…
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer-Mart\'inez power index (Colomer and Mart\'inez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41-63, 1995). Furthermore, we…
This work examines the Conditional Approval Framework for elections involving multiple interdependent issues, specifically focusing on the Conditional Minisum Approval Voting Rule. We first conduct a detailed analysis of the computational…
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…
We propose a statistical framework for quantifying the importance of single events that do not provide intermediate rewards but offer implicit incentives through the reward structure at the end of a multi-event contest. Applying the…
In this study, we propose a generalization of the classic model of liquid democracy that allows fractional delegation of voting weight, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of equilibrium states. Our approach empowers agents to…
The rapid development of technology has introduced new formats of human-computer interaction, which have in turn produced many new forms of media and a whole new field of interactive multimedia. One of the major mediums that has grown in…
Relying on recent generalizations of the Fra\"iss\'e theory to a broader category-theoretic context, we study the class of abstract finite games played between two players and show the existence of an infinitetly countable game which is…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to…
Statistical power is a measure of the replicability of a categorical hypothesis test. Formally, it is the probability of detecting an effect, if there is a true effect present in the population. Hence, optimizing statistical power as a…
This book summarizes ongoing research introducing probability space isomorphic mappings into the strategy spaces of game theory. This approach is motivated by discrepancies between probability theory and game theory when applied to the same…