Related papers: Truth and the liar paradox
The main subjects of this text are: (1) Generalization of concepts and operations, like distance and size, to situations where they are not definable in the usual way. (2) A pragmatic theory of handling contradictions using reliability of…
The liar paradox is widely seen as not a serious problem. I try to explain why this view is mistaken.
Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general,…
We present a version of G\"odel's Second Incompleteness Theorem for recursively enumerable consistent extensions of a fixed axiomatizable theory, by incorporating some bi-theoretic version of the derivability conditions. We also argue that…
The formalism of abstracted quantum mechanics is applied in a model of the generalized Liar Paradox. Here, the Liar Paradox, a consistently testable configuration of logical truth properties, is considered a dynamic conceptual entity in the…
This short note introduces a formal system of truth and paradoxicality, outlining the main motivation, and proving its $\omega$-consistency. The system is called TP, for 'Truth and Paradoxicality'.
In Outline of a Theory of Truth, Kripke introduces some of the central concepts of the logical study of truth and paradox. He informally defines some of these -- such as groundedness and paradoxicality -- using modal locutions. We introduce…
We present some arguments for the thesis that a set-theoretic inspired faith, in the ability of intuitive truth to faithfully reflect relationships between elements of a Platonic universe, may be as misplaced as an assumption that such…
Topological models of empirical and formal inquiry are increasingly prevalent. They have emerged in such diverse fields as domain theory [1, 16], formal learning theory [18], epistemology and philosophy of science [10, 15, 8, 9, 2],…
We study the structure of the partial order induced by the definability relation on definitions of truth for the language of arithmetic. Formally, a definition of truth is any sentence $\alpha$ which extends a weak arithmetical theory…
We investigate abstract model theoretic properties which holds for models in which a truth or satisfaction predicate for a sublanguage of the signature is definable. We analyse in which cases those properties in fact ensure the definability…
One of the greatest problems in philosophy is that of meaning. The turning point in thinking on meaning was Tarski's definition of truth, and the rapid development of logical semantics and model theory was a consequence of this achievement.…
This short squib looks at how using a broader definition of G\"odel numbering to mimic the accessibility relation between possible worlds results in two-world systems that sidestep undecidable sentences as well as the Liar paradox.
The reasoning with qualitative uncertainty measures involves comparative statements about events in terms of their likeliness without necessarily assigning an exact numerical value to these events. The paper is divided into two parts. In…
In this paper we discuss contrastive explanations for formal argumentation - the question why a certain argument (the fact) can be accepted, whilst another argument (the foil) cannot be accepted under various extension-based semantics. The…
Goedel's explicit thesis was that his undecidable formula GUS is a well-formed, well-defined formal sentence in any formalisation of Intuitive Arithmetic IA in which the axioms and rules of inference are recursively definable. His implicit…
We analyze the informal semantic conception of proof and axiomatize the proof relation and the provability operator. A self referential propositional calculus which admits provable liar type sentences is introduced and proven consistent. We…
We propose axioms governing the interaction of constructive assertibility and meaningfulness predicates with a self-applicative truth predicate characterized by the T-scheme, and we prove the consistency of the resulting formal system.
Logical paradoxes and inconsistent information pose deep challenges in epistemology and the philosophy of logic. Classical systems typically handle contradictions only through external checks or by altering the logical framework, as in…
We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge and evidence in which the agent may be uncertain about how to interpret their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state as a fixed subset of the state space, our…