Modal definability in Kripke's theory of truth
Logic
2025-03-27 v4
Abstract
In Outline of a Theory of Truth, Kripke introduces some of the central concepts of the logical study of truth and paradox. He informally defines some of these -- such as groundedness and paradoxicality -- using modal locutions. We introduce a modal language for regimenting these informal definitions. Though groundedness and paradoxicality are expressible in the modal language, we prove that intrinsicality -- which Kripke emphasizes but does not define modally -- is not. We characterize the modally definable relations and completely axiomatize the modal semantics.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2406.17091,
title = {Modal definability in Kripke's theory of truth},
author = {James Walsh},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.17091},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
Some typos have been corrected. Some citations have been added