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The new book by philosopher Deborah Mayo is relevant to data science for topical reasons, as she takes various controversial positions regarding hypothesis testing and statistical practice, and also as an entry point to thinking about the…

For many years, philosopher-of-statistics Deborah Mayo has been advocating the concept of severe testing as a key part of hypothesis testing. Her recent book, Statistical Inference as Severe Testing, is a comprehensive exposition of her…

This paper offers a comprehensive introduction to Bayesian inference, combining historical context, theoretical foundations, and core analytical examples. Beginning with Bayes' theorem and the philosophical distinctions between Bayesian and…

Classical statistics and Bayesian statistics refer to the frequentist and subjective theories of probability respectively. Von Mises and De Finetti, who authored those conceptualizations, provide interpretations of the probability that…

This chapter provides a overview of Bayesian inference, mostly emphasising that it is a universal method for summarising uncertainty and making estimates and predictions using probability statements conditional on observed data and an…

A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the…

The replication crisis has prompted many to call for statistical reform within the psychological sciences. Here we examine issues within Frequentist statistics that may have led to the replication crisis, and we examine the…

Bayesian and frequentist inference are two fundamental paradigms in statistical estimation. Bayesian methods treat hypotheses as random variables, incorporating priors and updating beliefs via Bayes' theorem, whereas frequentist methods…

In statistical practice, whether a Bayesian or frequentist approach is used in inference depends not only on the availability of prior information but also on the attitude taken toward partial prior information, with frequentists tending to…

We give a contributed discussion on "Model uncertainty and missing data: An Objective Bayesian Perspective", where we discuss frequentist perspectives on the proposed methodology.

When combining apparently inconsistent experimental results, one often implements errors on errors. The Particle Data Group's phenomenological prescription offers a practical solution but lacks a firm theoretical foundation. To address…

The classic frequentist theory of hypothesis testing developed by Neyman, Pearson and Fisher has a claim to being the twentieth century's most influential piece of applied mathematics. Something new is happening in the twenty-first century:…

This paper discusses the dual interpretation of the Jeffreys--Lindley's paradox associated with Bayesian posterior probabilities and Bayes factors, both as a differentiation between frequentist and Bayesian statistics and as a pointer to…

As the frontiers of applied statistics progress through increasingly complex experiments we must exploit increasingly sophisticated inferential models to analyze the observations we make. In order to avoid misleading or outright erroneous…

This note is a discussion of the paper "Confidence distribution" by Min-ge Xie and Kesar Singh, to appear in the International Statistical Review.

There are two main opposing schools of statistical reasoning, Frequentist and Bayesian approaches. Until recent days, the frequentist or classical approach has dominated the scientific research, but Bayesianism has reappeared with a strong…

Testing hypotheses is an issue of primary importance in the scientific research, as well as in many other human activities. Much clarification about it can be achieved if the process of learning from data is framed in a stochastic model of…

A common concern with Bayesian methodology in scientific contexts is that inferences can be heavily influenced by subjective biases. As presented here, there are two types of bias for some quantity of interest: bias against and bias in…

Don Fraser has given an interesting account of the agreements and disagreements between Bayesian posterior probabilities and confidence levels. In this comment I discuss some cases where the lack of such agreement is extreme. I then discuss…

The two statistical methods, namely the frequentist and the Bayesian methods, are both commonly used for probabilistic inference in many scientific situations. However, it is not straightforward to interpret the result of one approach in…