Related papers: Repeated Games With Intervention: Theory and Appli…
This paper reframes approachability theory within the context of population games. Thus, whilst one player aims at driving her average payoff to a predefined set, her opponent is not malevolent but rather extracted randomly from a…
The Internet has enabled the emergence of collective problem solving, also known as crowdsourcing, as a viable option for solving complex tasks. However, the openness of crowdsourcing presents a challenge because solutions obtained by it…
We study the problem of characterizing optimal learning algorithms for playing repeated games against an adversary with unknown payoffs. In this problem, the first player (called the learner) commits to a learning algorithm against a second…
Markov games with coupling constraints model constrained dynamical decision-making involving self-interested agents, where the feasibility of an individual agent's strategy depends on the joint strategies of the others. Such games arise in…
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…
Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution…
Many mechanisms for the emergence and maintenance of altruistic behavior in social dilemma situations have been proposed. Indirect reciprocity is one such mechanism, where other-regarding actions of a player are eventually rewarded by other…
We consider a sequential inspection game where an inspector uses a limited number of inspections over a larger number of time periods to detect a violation (an illegal act) of an inspectee. Compared with earlier models, we allow varying…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
This paper considers a distributed gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in networked games on graphs. In such games a player's cost function may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is…
Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and…
This paper develops a novel econometric framework for static discrete choice games with costly information acquisition. In traditional discrete games, players are assumed to perfectly know their own payoffs when making decisions, ignoring…
This paper studies the problem of intervention design for steering the actions of noncooperative players in quadratic network games to the social optimum. The players choose their actions with the aim of maximizing their individual payoff…
This paper introduces an explicit algorithm for computing perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoffs in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, public randomization, and discounting. The method adapts the established framework by…
Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…
We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of the game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…
The actions of intelligent agents, such as chatbots, recommender systems, and virtual assistants are typically not fully transparent to the user. Consequently, using such an agent involves the user exposing themselves to the risk that the…
Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner's dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been…