A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
Computer Science and Game Theory
2007-05-23 v1
Abstract
Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.
Cite
@article{arxiv.cs/0310039,
title = {A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems},
author = {Chiranjeeb Buragohain and Divyakant Agrawal and Subhash Suri},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:cs/0310039},
year = {2007}
}