Related papers: Yablo's Paradox And Arithmetical Incompleteness
We suggest a forcing version of Yablo's paradox and discuss its implication on self-reference.
In 1931, G\"odel presented in K\"onigsberg his famous Incompleteness Theorem, stating that some true mathematical statements are unprovable. Yet, this result gives us no idea about those independent (that is, true and unprovable)…
I outline a new theory of truth that resolves the classical and constructive versions of the liar paradox. The theory features a provably consistent axiomatization of a global self-applicative truth predicate. Truth is defined using…
The concept of informal mathematical proof considered in intuitionism is apparently vulnerable to a version of the liar paradox. However, a careful reevaluation of this concept reveals a subtle error whose correction blocks the…
An Isabelle/HOL formalisation of G\"odel's two incompleteness theorems is presented. The work follows \'Swierczkowski's detailed proof of the theorems using hereditarily finite (HF) set theory. Avoiding the usual arithmetical encodings of…
The Halting Problem is a version of the Liar's Paradox.
In this paper we briefly review and analyze three published proofs of Chaitin's theorem, the celebrated information-theoretic version of G\"odel's incompleteness theorem. Then, we discuss our main perplexity concerning a key step common to…
Possibilistic logic, an extension of first-order logic, deals with uncertainty that can be estimated in terms of possibility and necessity measures. Syntactically, this means that a first-order formula is equipped with a possibility degree…
We consider extensions of Peano arithmetic which include an assertibility predicate. Any such system which is arithmetically sound effectively verifies its own soundness. This leads to the resolution of a range of paradoxes involving…
Recent work by Faizal et al. (2025) claims that G\"odelian undecidability of non-algorithmic truths in our universe imply the impossibility of a formal, algorithmic simulation of the universe. This paper clarifies the distinction between…
The famous G\"odel incompleteness theorem states that for every consistent sufficiently rich formal theory T there exist true statements that are unprovable in T. Such statements would be natural candidates for being added as axioms, but…
In 1994 Jech gave a model theoretic proof of G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in the following form: ZF does not prove that ZF has a model. Kotlarski showed that Jech's proof can be adapted to Peano…
We analyze the informal notion of truth and conclude that it can be formalized in essentially two distinct ways: constructively, in terms of provability, or classically, as a hierarchy of concepts which satisfy Tarski's biconditional in…
We introduce our implementation in HOL Light of the metatheory for G\"odel-L\"ob provability logic (GL), covering soundness and completeness w.r.t. possible world semantics and featuring a prototype of a theorem prover for GL itself. The…
For Hilbert, the consistency of a formal theory T is an infinite series of statements "D is free of contradictions" for each derivation D and a consistency proof is i) an operation that, given D, yields a proof that D is free of…
Godelian sentences of a sufficiently strong and recursively enumerable theory, constructed in Godel's 1931 groundbreaking paper on the incompleteness theorems, are unprovable if the theory is consistent; however, they could be refutable.…
In this paper, we study the provability logic of intuitionistic theories of arithmetic that prove their own completeness. We prove a completeness theorem for theories equipped with two provability predicates $\Box$ and $\triangle$ that…
The main subjects of this text are: (1) Generalization of concepts and operations, like distance and size, to situations where they are not definable in the usual way. (2) A pragmatic theory of handling contradictions using reliability of…
G\"odel's Incompleteness Theorems suggest that no single formal system can capture the entirety of one's mathematical beliefs, while pointing at a hierarchy of systems of increasing logical strength that make progressively more explicit…
Recently, Artemov [4] offered the notion of constructive consistency for Peano Arithmetic and generalized it to constructive truth and falsity in the spirit of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics and its formalization, the Logic of Proofs.…