Related papers: Yablo's Paradox And Arithmetical Incompleteness
Paradoxes are interesting puzzles in philosophy and mathematics, and they could be even more fascinating, when turned into proofs and theorems. For example, Liar's paradox can be translated into a propositional tautology, and Barber's…
According to Chaitin, G\"odel once told him "it doesn't matter which paradox you use [to prove the First Incompleteness Theorem]". In this paper I will present a few infinitary paradoxes and show how to "translate" them to some undecidable…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
This short squib looks at how using a broader definition of G\"odel numbering to mimic the accessibility relation between possible worlds results in two-world systems that sidestep undecidable sentences as well as the Liar paradox.
The fact that the famous Godel incompleteness theorem and the archetype of all logical paradoxes, that of the Liar, are related closely is, of course, not only well known, but is a part of the common knowledge of logician community.…
I present the proof of Goedel's First Incompleteness theorem in an intuitive manner, while covering all technically challenging steps. I present generalizations of Goedel's fixed point lemma to two-sentence and multi-sentence versions,…
This paper gives a counterexample to the impossibility, by G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem, of proving a formula expressing the consistency of arithmetic in a fragment of arithmetic on the assumption that the latter is consistent.…
G{\"o}del's completeness theorem for classical first-order logic is one of the most basic theorems of logic. Central to any foundational course in logic, it connects the notion of valid formula to the notion of provable formula.We survey a…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is proved for Herbrand consistency of some arithmetical theories with bounded induction, by using a technique of logarithmic shrinking the witnesses of bounded formulas, due to Z. Adamowicz [Herbrand…
In this article we discuss the proof in the short unpublished paper appeared in the 3rd volume of Godel's Collected Works entitled "On undecidable sentences" (*1931?), which provides an introduction to Godel's 1931 ideas regarding the…
A rather easy yet rigorous proof of a version of G\"odel's first incompleteness theorem is presented. The version is "each recursively enumerable theory of natural numbers with 0, 1, +, *, =, logical and, logical not, and the universal…
To counter a general belief that all the paradoxes stem from a kind of circularity (or involve some self--reference, or use a diagonal argument) Stephen Yablo designed a paradox in 1993 that seemingly avoided self--reference. We turn…
We demonstrate that, in itself and in the absence of extra premises, the following argument scheme is fallacious: The sentence A says about itself that it has a certain property F, and A does in fact have the property F; therefore A is…
We take an argument of G\"odel's from his ground-breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: the sentence $G$ says about itself that it is not provable, and $G$ is indeed not provable;…
The predicate complementary to the well-known Godel's provability predicate is defined. From its recursiveness new consequences concerning the incompleteness argumentation are drawn and extended to new results of consistency, completeness…
I'll discuss how Goedel's paradox "This statement is false/unprovable" yields his famous result on the limits of axiomatic reasoning. I'll contrast that with my work, which is based on the paradox of "The first uninteresting positive whole…
In this paper we prove Chaitin's ``heuristic principle'', {\it the theorems of a finitely-specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself}, for an appropriate measure of complexity. We show that the measure is…
In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…
We give a reframing of Godel's first and second incompleteness theorems that applies even to some undefinable theories of arithmetic. The usual Hilbert-Bernays provability conditions and the diagonal lemma are replaced by a more direct…
We present a version of G\"odel's Second Incompleteness Theorem for recursively enumerable consistent extensions of a fixed axiomatizable theory, by incorporating some bi-theoretic version of the derivability conditions. We also argue that…