Related papers: Asymetric Pavlovian Populations
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…
In this paper we study population protocols governed by the {\em random scheduler}, which uniformly at random selects pairwise interactions between $n$ agents. The main result of this paper is the first time and space optimal {\em exact…
We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…
We propose a new evolutionary dynamics for population games with a discrete strategy set, inspired by the theory of optimal transport and Mean field games. The dynamics can be described as a Fokker-Planck equation on a discrete strategy…
The {\em parallel time} of a population protocol is defined as the average number of required interactions that an agent in the protocol participates, i.e., the quotient between the total number of interactions required by the protocol and…
Social conventions govern countless behaviors all of us engage in every day, from how we greet each other to the languages we speak. But how can shared conventions emerge spontaneously in the absence of a central coordinating authority? The…
Methods like multi-agent reinforcement learning struggle to scale with growing population size. Mean-field games (MFGs) are a game-theoretic approach that can circumvent this by finding a solution for an abstract infinite population, which…
We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…
An universal primal-dual approach of description equilibriums in large class of hierarchical congestion population games is proposed. At the very core of the approach is hierarchy of enclosed to each other transport networks. In different…
We consider a repeated game in which players, considered as nodes of a network, are connected. Each player observes her neighbors' moves only. Thus, monitoring is private and imperfect. Players can communicate with their neighbors at each…
Robotic agents must adopt existing social conventions in order to be effective teammates. These social conventions, such as driving on the right or left side of the road, are arbitrary choices among optimal policies, but all agents on a…
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in arXiv:1307.2145, arXiv:1403.4958. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given…
Protecting against adversarial attacks is a common multiagent problem. Attackers in the real world are predominantly human actors, and the protection methods often incorporate opponent models to improve the performance when facing humans.…
In this paper, we focus on graph class identification problems in the population protocol model. A graph class identification problem aims to decide whether a given communication graph is in the desired class (e.g. whether the given…
We discuss a population of sequences subject to mutations and frequency-dependent selection, where the fitness of a sequence depends on the composition of the entire population. This type of dynamics is crucial to understand the evolution…
Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…
Motivated by a general principle governing regulation mechanisms in biological cells, we investigate a general interaction scheme between different populations of particles and specific particles, referred to as agents. Assuming that each…
A population protocol can be viewed as a sequence of pairwise interactions of $n$ agents (nodes). During one interaction, two agents selected uniformly at random update their states by applying a specified deterministic transition function.…
Whether a population of decision-making individuals will reach a state of satisfactory decisions is a fundamental problem in studying collective behaviors. In the framework of evolutionary game theory and by means of potential functions,…