Related papers: Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinato…

Constrained maximization of submodular functions poses a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, a number of agents need to maximize multiple submodular objectives over the same ground set. We study such…

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…

Consider Myerson's optimal auction with respect to an inaccurate prior, e.g., estimated from data, which is an underestimation of the true value distribution. Can the auctioneer expect getting at least the optimal revenue w.r.t. the…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…

We consider the problem of converting an arbitrary approximation algorithm for a single-parameter optimization problem into a computationally efficient truthful mechanism. We ask for reductions that are black-box, meaning that they require…

An elegant characterization of the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems has emerged in the form of the the algebraic dichotomy conjecture of [BKJ00]. Roughly speaking, the characterization asserts that a CSP {\Lambda} is tractable…

The secretary and the prophet inequality problems are central to the field of Stopping Theory. Recently, there has been a lot of work in generalizing these models to multiple items because of their applications in mechanism design. The most…

We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences into a single output allocation. Motivated by scenarios in…

Since Tinhofer proposed the MinGreedy algorithm for maximum cardinality matching in 1984, several experimental studies found the randomized algorithm to perform excellently for various classes of random graphs and benchmark instances. In…

Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…

Many high-stakes AI deployments proceed only if every stakeholder deems the system acceptable relative to their own minimum standard. With randomization over a finite menu of options, this becomes a feasibility question: does there exist a…

In this paper, we focus our attention on the large capacities unsplittable flow problem in a game theoretic setting. In this setting, there are selfish agents, which control some of the requests characteristics, and may be dishonest about…

Scheduling on related machines ($Q||C_{\max}$) is one of the most important problems in the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Each machine is controlled by a selfish agent and her valuation can be expressed via a single parameter, her…

In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…

We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in…

Submodular maximization is one of the central topics in combinatorial optimization. It has found numerous applications in the real world. In the past decades, a series of algorithms have been proposed for this problem. However, most of the…

We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…

We consider the scheduling problem on $n$ strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias, Theory Comput. Syst. (2014)] where a machine…

We consider the problem of maximizing a monotone submodular function under noise. There has been a great deal of work on optimization of submodular functions under various constraints, resulting in algorithms that provide desirable…

In this work, we consider the problem of minimising the social cost in atomic congestion games. For this problem, we provide tight computational lower bounds along with taxation mechanisms yielding polynomial time algorithms with optimal…