Related papers: Robust Stackelberg game in communication systems
This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg…
This paper proposes a peer-to-peer energy trading scheme that can help the centralized power system to reduce the total electricity demand of its customers at the peak hour. To do so, a cooperative Stackelberg game is formulated, in which…
We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game with partial information and common noise, which contains a leader and a large number of followers. To be specific, the followers face a…
We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…
We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model…
Online social networks exert a powerful influence on public opinion. Adversaries weaponize these networks to manipulate discourse, underscoring the need for more resilient social networks. To this end, we investigate the impact of network…
We study linear quadratic dynamic games where players are uncertain about each other's control policies or goals and consequently seek to be strategically robust. Building on recent work on strategically robust and risk-averse game theory,…
This paper investigates effects of realistic, non-ideal, decisions of energy users as to whether to participate in an energy trading system proposed for demand-side management of a residential community. The energy trading system adopts a…
We study incentive designs for a class of stochastic Stackelberg games with one leader and a large number of (finite as well as infinite population of) followers. We investigate whether the leader can craft a strategy under a dynamic…
How important are leaders' actions in facilitating coordination? In this paper, we investigate their signaling role in a global games framework. A perfectly informed leader and a team of followers face a coordination problem. Despite the…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…
This paper is concerned with an overlapping information linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg stochastic differential game with two leaders and two followers, where the diffusion terms of the state equation contain both the control and state…
In this paper, the known deterministic linear-quadratic Stackelberg game is revisited, whose open-loop Stackelberg solution actually possesses the nature of time inconsistency. To handle this time inconsistency, {a two-tier game framework…
As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the…
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…
We consider a scenario where $N$ users send packets to a common access point. The receiver decodes the message of each user by treating the other user's signals as noise. Associated with each user is its channel state and a finite queue…
Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…
We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal…