Related papers: Robust Stackelberg game in communication systems
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic partially observed Stackelberg stochastic differential game with correlated state and observation noises, where the diffusion coefficient does not contain the control variable and the control…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
Device coordination in open spectrum systems is a challenging problem, particularly since users experience varying spectrum availability over time and location. In this paper, we propose a game theoretical approach that allows cognitive…
This article studies linear-quadratic Stackelberg games between two dominating players (or equivalently, leaders) and a large group of followers, each of whom interacts under a mean field game (MFG) framework. Unlike the conventional…
This paper is devoted to a high-dimensional mixed leadership stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information mode, where the control variables enter into the diffusion term of state equation. A verification theorem…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
We study games in which a leader makes a single commitment, and then multiple followers (each with a different utility function) respond. In particular, we study ambiguous commitment strategies in these games, in which the leader may commit…
Multi-defender Stackelberg Security Games (MSSG) have recently gained increasing attention in the literature. However, the solutions offered to date are highly sensitive, wherein even small perturbations in the attacker's utility or slight…
In this paper, we study a linear-quadratic partially observed Stackelberg stochastic differential game problem in which a single leader and multiple followers are involved. We consider more practical formulation for partial information that…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…
We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and users care about…
Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weighted graph by Leader (Player 0) and Follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, Leader announces her strategy, second,…
We consider the problem of decentralized power allocation for competitive rate-maximization in a frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel under bounded channel uncertainty. We formulate a distribution-free robust framework for the…
In this paper, the two-player leader-follower game with private inputs for feedback Stackelberg strategy is considered. In particular, the follower shares its measurement information with the leader except its historical control inputs…
Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…
Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain…