Related papers: Evolutionary Games for Multiple Access Control
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…
We establish the existence and uniqueness of distributed equilibria to possibly nonsymmetric $N$ player differential games with interactions through controls under displacement semimonotonicity assumptions. Surprisingly, the nonseparable…
We study the role of local effects and finite size effects in reaching coordination and in equilibrium selection in different types of two-player coordination games. We investigate three update rules -- the replicator dynamics (RD), the…
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric $N$-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other…
We show that evolutionarily stable states in general (nonlinear) population games (which can be viewed as continuous vector fields constrained on a polytope) are asymptotically stable under a multiplicative weights dynamic (under…
Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated as a black…
We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…
We consider a wireless communication system in which $N$ transmitter-receiver pairs want to communicate with each other. Each transmitter transmits data at a certain rate using a power that depends on the channel gain to its receiver. If a…
The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and an inefficient symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are…
People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can be studied with learning theory and evolutionary game…
How coperation between self-interested individuals evolve is a crucial problem, both in biology and in social sciences, that is far from being well understood. Evolutionary game theory is a useful approach to this issue. The simplest model…
We introduce a new class of population games that we call monotropic; these are games characterized by the presence of a unique globally neutrally stable Nash equilibrium. Monotropic games generalize strictly concave potential games and…
After defining a pure-action profile in a nonatomic aggregative game, where players have specific compact convex pure-action sets and nonsmooth convex cost functions, as a square-integrable function, we characterize a Wardrop equilibrium as…
We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The first is the…
Whether a population of decision-making individuals will reach a state of satisfactory decisions is a fundamental problem in studying collective behaviors. In the framework of evolutionary game theory and by means of potential functions,…
Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in…
In this paper, we analyse inspection games with an evolutionary perspective. In our evolutionary inspection game with a large population, each individual is not a rational payoff maximiser, but periodically updates his strategy if he…