Related papers: Reactivity in decision-form games
It is often difficult to hand-specify what the correct reward function is for a task, so researchers have instead aimed to learn reward functions from human behavior or feedback. The types of behavior interpreted as evidence of the reward…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide…
In this paper, we introduce a novel rule for synthesis of reactive systems, applicable to systems made of n components which have each their own objectives. It is based on the notion of admissible strategies. We compare our novel rule with…
We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…
When predictions support decisions they may influence the outcome they aim to predict. We call such predictions performative; the prediction influences the target. Performativity is a well-studied phenomenon in policy-making that has so far…
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…
It has been shown that a functional interpretation of proofs in mathematical analysis can be given by the product of selection functions, a mode of recursion that has an intuitive reading in terms of the computation of optimal strategies in…
We introduce the notion of online reactive planning with sensing actions for systems with temporal logic constraints in partially observable and dynamic environments. With incomplete information on the dynamic environment, reactive…
Games have long been a microcosm for studying planning and reasoning in both natural and artificial intelligence, especially with a focus on expert-level or even super-human play. But real life also pushes human intelligence along a…
Self-serving, rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit. The two-player iterated prisoner's dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum…
Contact-based decision and planning methods are becoming increasingly important to endow higher levels of autonomy for legged robots. Formal synthesis methods derived from symbolic systems have great potential for reasoning about high-level…
Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…
In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is…
Dynamic zero-sum games are an important class of problems with applications ranging from evasion-pursuit and heads-up poker to certain adversarial versions of control problems such as multi-armed bandit and multiclass queuing problems.…
We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of \emph{knowledge-based programs}. Intuitively, all solution…
Stochastic games have become a prevalent framework for studying long-term multi-agent interactions, especially in the context of multi-agent reinforcement learning. In this work, we comprehensively investigate the concept of constant-memory…
We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are "strategically equivalent" if, for every…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
We define the class of "simple recursive games". A simple recursive game is defined as a simple stochastic game (a notion due to Anne Condon), except that we allow arbitrary real payoffs but disallow moves of chance. We study the complexity…