Related papers: Complexity of coalition structure generation

Solutions to the coalition formation problem commonly assume agent rationality and, correspondingly, utility maximization. This in turn may prevent agents from making compromises. As shown in recent studies, compromise may facilitate…

In studies of social dynamics, cohesion refers to a group's tendency to stay in unity, which -- as argued in sociometry -- arises from the network topology of interpersonal ties between members of the group. We follow this idea and propose…

We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…

In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…

We consider a refinement of the partition function of graph homomorphisms and present a quasi-polynomial algorithm to compute it in a certain domain. As a corollary, we obtain quasi-polynomial algorithms for computing partition functions…

An action of a group on a vector space partitions the latter into a set of orbits. We consider three natural and useful algorithmic "isomorphism" or "classification" problems, namely, orbit equality, orbit closure intersection, and orbit…

The main purpose of this paper is to study the NP-complete subset-sum problem, not in the usual context of time-complexity-based classification of the algorithms (exponential/polynomial), but through a new kind of algorithmic classification…

Hedonic games are a prominent model of coalition formation, in which each agent's utility only depends on the coalition she resides. The subclass of hedonic games that models the formation of general partnerships, where output is shared…

We study here several variants of the covariates fine balance problem where we generalize some of these problems and introduce a number of others. We present here a comprehensive complexity study of the covariates problems providing…

Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formation is unstable and incentivizes deviation from the proposed…

Many combinatorial optimization problems are often considered intractable to solve exactly or by approximation. An example of such problem is maximum clique which -- under standard assumptions in complexity theory -- cannot be solved in…

We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…

This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational…

We consider several subgroup-related algorithmic questions in groups, modeled after the classic computational lattice problems, and study their computational complexity. We find polynomial time solutions to problems like finding a subgroup…

We initiate the study of a quantity that we call coordination complexity. In a distributed optimization problem, the information defining a problem instance is distributed among $n$ parties, who need to each choose an action, which jointly…

Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…

Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition formation in…

We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…

This paper introduces a novel concept from coalitional game theory which allows the dynamic formation of coalitions among wireless nodes. A simple and distributed merge and split algorithm for coalition formation is constructed. This…