Related papers: Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbit…

I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest…

In this Letter we present a new perspective for the study of the Public Goods games on complex networks. The idea of our approach is to consider a realistic structure for the groups in which Public goods games are played. Instead of…

We initiate the study of the effects of non-transparency in decision rules on individuals' ability to improve in strategic learning settings. Inspired by real-life settings, such as loan approvals and college admissions, we remove the…

Optimization is widely used for decision making across various domains, valued for its ability to improve efficiency. However, poor implementation practices can lead to unintended consequences, particularly in socioeconomic contexts where…

The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externalities firms face when data, though inherently freely…

Prediction markets are powerful tools to elicit and aggregate beliefs from strategic agents. However, in current prediction markets, agents may exhaust the social welfare by competing to be the first to update the market. We initiate the…

The connection between messaging and action is fundamental both to web applications, such as web search and sentiment analysis, and to economics. However, while prominent online applications exploit messaging in natural (human) language in…

Dynamic epistemic logics consider formal representations of agents' knowledge, and how the knowledge of agents changes in response to informative events, such as public announcements. Quantifying over informative events allows us to ask…

Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The common approach to handle uncertainty is by maximizing expected…

The aim of the strategic analysis is to (simply) carry out the game between the implementing body and possible links to the existing market situation. We are therefore playing a strategic game between us and the outside world. This…

We extend recent analyses of stochastic effects in game dynamical learning to cases of multi-player games, and to games defined on networked structures. By means of an expansion in the noise strength we consider the weak-noise limit, and…

We propose a multi-agent epistemic logic of asynchronous announcements, where truthful announcements are publicly sent but individually received by agents, and in the order in which they were sent. Additional to epistemic modalities the…

We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…

In the naming game, individuals or agents exchange pairwise local information in order to communicate about objects in their common environment. The goal of the game is to reach a consensus about naming these objects. Originally used to…

We define a new concept of "mistake" strategies and actions for strategic-form and extensive-form games, analyze the relationship to prior main game-theoretic solution concepts, study algorithms for computation, and explore practicality.…

We present infinite extensive strategy profiles with perfect information and we show that replacing finite by infinite changes the notions and the reasoning tools. The presentation uses a formalism recently developed by logicians and…

Quite some work in the ATL-tradition uses the differences between various types of strategies (positional, uniform, perfect recall) to give alternative semantics to the same logical language. This paper contributes to another perspective on…

In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to ideally obtain a positive classification from the learner's classifier. The typical response of the learner is to carefully modify their classifier to be robust to…

We study a regime change game in which the state and an opposition leader both observe the regime's true strength and may engage in costly communication by manipulating the mean of citizens' private signals. Each citizen then decides…

In a prediction market, individuals can sequentially place bets on the outcome of a future event. This leaves a trail of personal probabilities for the event, each being conditional on the current individual's private background knowledge…