Related papers: Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbit…

This thesis presents some geometric insights into three different types of two player prediction games -- namely general learning task, prediction with expert advice, and online convex optimization. These games differ in the nature of the…

It is common to make a distinction between "strategic" behavior and other forms of intentional but "nonstrategic" behavior: typically, that strategic agents model other agents while nonstrategic agents do not. However, a crisp boundary…

A combinatorial game is a two-player game without hidden information or chance elements. The main object of combinatorial game theory is to obtain the outcome, which player has a winning strategy, of a given combinatorial game. Positions of…

Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…

In this paper we describe an approach to resolve strategic games in which players can assume different types along the game. Our goal is to infer which type the opponent is adopting at each moment so that we can increase the player's odds.…

Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…

Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to…

We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions in a proportional manner. Our focus is on interconnected…

In this paper we design information elicitation mechanisms for Bayesian auctions. While in Bayesian mechanism design the distributions of the players' private types are often assumed to be common knowledge, information elicitation considers…

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…

The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…

A set of agents has to make a decision about the provision of a public good and its financing. Agents have heterogeneous values for the public good and each agent's value is private information. An agenda-setter has the right to make a…

We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is…

This paper formally models the strategic repeated interactions between a system, comprising of a machine learning (ML) model and associated explanation method, and an end-user who is seeking a prediction/label and its explanation for a…

To propose a mathematical model of consciousness and will, we first simulated the inverted qualia with a toy model of a neural network. As a result, we confirmed that there can be an inverted qualia on the neural network. In other words,…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We investigate the dynamics of the choice of an active strategy in the minority game. A history distribution is introduced as an analytical tool to study the asymmetry between the two choices offered to the agents. Its properties are…

This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the…

The article considers strategies of coalitions that are based on intelligence information about moves of some of the other agents. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between…

Strategic classification studies the design of a classifier robust to the manipulation of input by strategic individuals. However, the existing literature does not consider the effect of competition among individuals as induced by the…