Related papers: Minimum regulation of uncoordinated matchings

We study an optimal targeting problem for super-modular games with binary actions and finitely many players. The considered problem consists in the selection of a subset of players of minimum size such that, when the actions of these…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework,…

Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…

We study rational synthesis problems for concurrent games with omega-regular objectives. Our model of rationality considers only pure strategy Nash equilibria that satisfy either a social welfare or Pareto optimality condition with respect…

Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games on graphs, where players have private, partially-ordered…

We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There are $n$ players, $n\geq 3$. Each player is denoted by $i$. Two strategic variables are $t_i$ and $s_i$, $i\in \{1, \dots, n\}$. They are related by…

In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…

In this article, we consider generalized Nash games where the associated constraint map is not necessarily self. The classical Nash equilibrium may not exist for such games and therefore we introduce the notion of best approximate solution…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…

Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…

In this paper, we consider coordination and anti-coordination heterogeneous games played by a finite population formed by different types of individuals who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. We show…

Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…

This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, which are a general class of strategic games used to succinctly represent the players' private costs. There is a finite set of resources and the strategy set…

The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…

Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that…

There has been substantial progress on finding game-theoretic equilibria. Most of that work has focused on games with finite, discrete action spaces. However, many games involving space, time, money, and other fine-grained quantities have…

This paper studies $n$-person simultaneous-move games with linear best response function, where individuals interact within a given network structure. This class of games have been used to model various settings, such as, public goods,…