Related papers: Can Partisan Voting Lead to Truth?
In traditional voter models, opinion dynamics are driven by interactions between individuals, where an individual adopts the opinion of a randomly chosen neighbor. However, these models often fail to capture the emergence of entirely new…
We establish an approach for consensus control of opinion dynamics by introducing a liar to the classical system. The liar's aim is to steer the population towards consensus at their goal opinion by showing 'apparent opinions', or 'lies',…
We formulate the problem of fake news detection using distributed fact-checkers (agents) with unknown reliability. The stream of news/statements is modeled as an independent and identically distributed binary source (to represent true and…
Given the fast rise of increasingly autonomous artificial agents and robots, a key acceptability criterion will be the possible moral implications of their actions. In particular, intelligent persuasive systems (systems designed to…
We investigate opinion dynamics in a fully-connected system, consisting of $n$ identical and anonymous agents, where one of the opinions (which is called correct) represents a piece of information to disseminate. In more detail, one source…
We study the Consensus problem among $n$ agents, defined as follows. Initially, each agent holds one of two possible opinions. The goal is to reach a consensus configuration in which every agent shares the same opinion. To this end, agents…
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss,…
The q-voter model, a variant of the classic voter model, has been analyzed by several authors: while allowing to study opinion dynamics, this model is also believed to be one of the most representative among the many defined in the wide…
We present numerical simulations of a model of social influence, where the opinion of each agent is represented by a binary vector. Agents adjust their opinions as a result of random encounters, whenever the difference between opinions is…
We introduce a socially motivated extension of the voter model in which individual voters are also influenced by two opposing, fixed-opinion news sources. These sources forestall consensus and instead drive the population to a politically…
Elections play a fundamental role in democratic societies, however they are often characterized by unexpected results. Here we discuss an election campaign model inspired by the compartmental epidemiology, and we show that the model…
We consider a setting with agents that have preferences over alternatives and are partitioned into disjoint districts. The goal is to choose one alternative as the winner using a mechanism which first decides a representative alternative…
The conventional voter model is modified so that an agent's switching rate depends on the `age' of the agent, that is, the time since the agent last switched opinion. In contrast to previous work, age is continuous in the present model. We…
Deception is a fundamental issue across a diverse array of settings, from cybersecurity, where decoys (e.g., honeypots) are an important tool, to politics that can feature politically motivated "leaks" and fake news about candidates.Typical…
We propose a model for diffusion of two opposite opinions. Here, the decision to be taken by each individual is a random variable which depends on the tendency of the population, as well on its own trend characteristic. The influence of the…
The outcomes of democratic elections rest on individuals' decision-making that is driven by their varying preferences and beliefs. Individuals may prefer consensus to gridlock, or gridlock to consensus, and information may be fractured via…
This paper studies a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which information might be secretly manipulated. A principal must choose between a safe action with known payoff and a risky action with uncertain payoff, favoring the safe…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
Previous explanations for the persistence of polarization of opinions have typically included modelling assumptions that predispose the possibility of polarization (i.e., assumptions allowing a pair of agents to drift apart in their opinion…