Related papers: Reply to "Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on…

This is a comment on the publication by Yuan et al. [Appl. Phys. Lett. 98, 231104 (2011); arXiv:1106.2675v1 [quant-ph]].

A particularly successful detector blinding attack has been recently demonstrated on various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, performing for the first time an undetectable and complete recovery of the key. In this paper two original…

This is a Reply to the Comment by Lydersen et al. [arXiv: 1106.3756v1].

In this paper, we briefly show how the quantum key distribution with blind polarization bases [Kye et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 040501 (2005)] can be made secure against the invisible photon attack.

In this paper, we briefly show how the quantum key distribution with blind polarization bases [Kye et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 040501 (2005)] can be made secure against the impersonation attack.

This is a brief comment on the Letter by Balygin and his coworkers [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]. We point out an error that invalidates the Letter's conclusions.

Elementary review article on quantum cryptography.

In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the Quantum Dense Key Distribution protocol detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by Wojcik in his Comment.

We show an eavesdropping scheme, by which the eavesdropper can achieve the full information of the key against the protocol [Kye et al., PRL 95 040501 (2005)] with a probability of unity and will not be discovered by the the legitimate…

We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a…

This is our Reply to Peres' Comment [quant-ph/9509003] to "Quantum Cryptography Based on Orthogonal States" [Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 1239 (1995)].

Detector blinding attacks have been proposed in the last few years, and they could potentially threaten the security of QKD systems. Even though no complete QKD system has been hacked yet, it is nevertheless important to consider…

Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the…

This is a Comment on Phys Rev Lett 75 (1995) 1239, by Goldenberg and Vaidman

This is a chapter on quantum cryptography for the book "A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Information Security" to be published by CRC Press in 2011/2012. The chapter aims to introduce the topic to undergraduate-level and…

In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating…

We show that, using Wang et al. attack [T.-y. Wang, Q.-y. Wen, F. Gao, S. Lin, F.-c. Zhu, Phys. Lett. A 373 (2008) 65], the first agent and the last agent cannot eavesdrop all the secret messages in Zhang et al. QSSCM scheme [Z.-j. Zhang,…

Quantum cryptography is reviewed, first using entanglement both for the intuition and for the experimental realizations. Next, the implementation is simplified in several steps until it becomes practical. At this point entanglement has…

In this Comment we question the security of recently proposed by Degiovanni et al. [Phys. Rev. A 69 (2004) 032310] scheme of quantum dense key distribution.

Continuous-variable quantum key distribution provides a theoretical unconditionally secure solution to distribute symmetric keys among users in a communication network. However, the practical devices used to implement these systems are…